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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background and motivation 
The European Union (EU) manufacturing’s share in gross domestic product (GDP) 
has continuously declined over a number of years reaching its trough in the mid of 
2009 (Veugelers, 2013 and European Competitiveness Report, 2013). The financial 
crisis that began in 2008 accelerated this decline. Whereas EU manufacturing 
recovered earlier from its dip in 2009 than the United States (US), since the end of 
2011, EU has been lagging behind. The recovery in the two previous recessions 
since 1990 was also faster in the US than in EU. Despite its decreasing and small 
share of value added and employment, manufacturing industry is still playing an 
important role in the EU economy, being a driver of exports, research and 
development (R&D) and innovation. In contrast to the reduced domestic demand 
due to public and private debt problems, demand for EU exports has grown. As 
Veugelers (2013) affirms, a new and decisive discussion on the future of 
manufacturing has arisen in Europe, the United States and Japan. In comparison to 
services, EU manufacturing is relatively reducing its weight in GDP, but the crisis 
that started in 2008 has changed the perceptions of the role of the manufacturing 
industry. It brought back into the center of the scene the benefits of a strong and 
stable manufacturing base. 
 
The fact that some EU countries with a large and stable manufacturing base have 
better overcome the crisis and also recovered earlier has redeemed the reputation of 
manufacturing industry. To have a dynamic manufacturing sector is considered 
again a prerequisite for an innovative and fast-growing economy (Reiner, 2012; 
Fürst 2013. As the European Commission (2010) states “a vibrant and highly 
competitive EU manufacturing sector is a key element for solving societal changes 
ahead and for a more sustainable, inclusive and resource-efficient economy”.  
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As Dhèret (2014) states de-industrialisation is no longer perceived as a natural 
process of economic development and the focus on the services sector has 
somewhat faded away due to several factors. The high volatility of financial markets 
and the recent bursting of the financial sector have obviously contributed to revive 
the interest in manufacturing. This change is also explained by some strong evidence 
showing that manufacturing is an essential pillar of the economy as "additional final 
demand in manufacturing generates around half as much additional final demand 
elsewhere in the economy" (European Competitiveness Report, 2013).  
 
Innovation and specialised service inputs are becoming key factor in manufacturing 
production. Particularly, specialized service inputs increased their relevance for 
product differentiation and quality improvements of manufactures allowing 
companies to charge higher prices and to generate higher value added. All this is 
indicative for the increasing interlinkages between manufactures and services, so the 
discussion is no longer on which of these sectors should become the key driver of 
economic growth, but how to collaborate efficiently.  
 
So, among the main arguments in favour of a strong manufacturing base are that 
manufacturing industry is an important source of innovation and technological 
progress, and, too, because of its increasing interlinkages with services. 
Furthermore, manufactures tend to invest more in innovation activities than 
services industries. Indeed, according to European Competitiveness Report (2013), 
manufacturing represents the major source of investment in R&D (65.3% between 
2008 and 2010), a key source of exports (67% of Europe's exports) and a main 
driver for employment in other sectors, including services (each additional job in 
manufacturing creates 0.5-2 jobs in other sectors). Another common argument for 
the relevant role of manufacturing is that labour productivity growth is higher in this 
sector than in the rest of the economy. This argument is strongly related to that of 
innovation, because R&D and innovation nourish technological progress and labour 
productivity growth. It also shows the particularity that the sector of origin of 
technological progress is not necessarily the one that benefits most intensively from 
new technologies.  
 
Since labour productivity growth is considered a key source of economic growth, it 
is easy to understand that not quite a few authors have examined and are still 
interested in its performance in manufacturing industry (Fabricant, 1942; Solow, 
1956 and 1957; Jorgenson (Dir.), 1995 and 1996; Jorgenson et al., 2005; Bernard, et 
al., 1996; Mas et al., 2012; Roth and Thum, 2013; Muntean; 2014). Since 1995 the 
rate of labour productivity growth in Europe fell throughout the period, with the 
exception of two brief positive spells during the peaks of the business cycle at the 
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end of the 1990s and around 2006–2007. Finally, during the Great Recession in 
2008-09, the EU saw a decline in labour productivity parallel to the contraction of 
the economy. 
 
Before the crisis that started during 2007-2008, the debate on labour productivity 
slowdown indicated that Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
capital accumulation was the main explanation for the underperformance of EU 
labour productivity (Rincon et al., 2012; Timmer et al., 2010; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 
2009; Van Ark et al., 2008; Jorgenson and Vu, 2005; Inklaar et al, 2005; Stiroh, 2002). 
The benefits of the modern knowledge economy differ greatly between advanced 
economies. Slower adoption of ICT technologies in the EU in contrast to the US, 
specifically in services sectors was considered for a long time as the major reason for 
it. The hypothesis was that, as a consequence of this lag, it would take some time for 
its benefits to materialize in EU. But several years later after the “ICT revolution”, 
the EU has only not caught up with the US, but the productivity gap has grown. 
Several authors (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2009) 
demonstrated that too low investment in the skills and the absence of organizational 
changes necessary to reap the benefits of ICT technologies were the main 
explanation for it. Lower investment rates in intangible assets (R&D, design, human 
and organisational capital, etc.) are likely to explain this behaviour of labour 
productivity in EU, as these factors affect countries' absorptive capacity, i.e. their 
ability to take advantage of the technology developed elsewhere (international 
technology transfers) (European Competitiveness Report, 2013). 
 
Although the recession which began in 2008 had a global impact, some countries 
have been recovering faster than others. EU seems to have difficulties in recovering 
and these are not homogenous across the countries. The continent has been divided 
between a “centre” with a strong industry, and a “periphery” with a weak industry 
and great difficulties for recovery (Pianta, 2013). This polarization is evident in 
Eurostat data on industrial production. With 2010 data equal to 100, in June 2013 
Germany’s index was 110.2, Austria’s 105.8, Denmark’s 106 and France’s 102.6. 
Conversely, Italy’s index was 96.9, Spain’s 95.9, Portugal’s 95.3 and Greece’s 93.7 
(Eurostat, 2013). While countries like Romania, Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic 
states have already exceeded their pre-recession peak of industrial output, not quite 
few Member States have reached their previous levels. Concretely, those countries 
in Southern Europe are still displaying difficulties to overcome the consequences of 
the recession and start their recovery. Several factors slow the recovery in the south 
of Europe like private sector deleveraging, the gradual reduction of public deficits, a 
weak business environment and comparatively high borrowing costs. All these 
factors together with the convenience to reduce high external debt levels are 
Chapter 1 
4 
indicative that presently the main source of growth should come from the external 
sector, ie from exports of goods and services (Vihriäla and Wolff, 2013).  
 
Despite the decline in the 2000s has been similar in France and Belgium, the level in 
southern Europe is lower. In contrast, northern Europe and Germany, in particular, 
maintained a strong a stable manufacturing base. The constant share of 
manufacturing in Germany stands out as exceptional and can likely be ascribed to 
successful integration of German industry into the European and global value chain.  
Traditionally, southern Europe’s exports have been more concentrated than the EU 
as a whole in services, tourism in particular, in relation to manufacturing. In 
addition, non-manufactured goods represent the bulk of exports from the south 
than from the north of Europe. In comparison to the EU as a whole the share of 
service exports was less than 1% greater. The difference between the southern 
European member states relative to EU as a whole is mainly explained by the larger 
weight of non-manufacture goods in total exports. As far as the manufacturing 
sector is one of the key sectors promoting exports performance and an important 
source of growth, and taking into account that internal demand keeps weak, 
manufacturing’s competitiveness needs to be improved so that growth through 
exports can be guaranteed. The strong export growth in parts of southern Europe 
since the crisis is an indication of the potential of the firms in the region. But they 
face an uneven playing field compared to competitors in the north because of the 
south’s structural shortcomings and because of current tight financing conditions. 
Action by policymakers is required to overcome these obstacles.  
 
So according to Dhéret’s criteria (2014), the “centre” has largely preserved its 
industrial base and increased its exports to the “periphery”, while Europe’s 
periphery is heading toward a spiral of losses of income, jobs, production and 
exports. As Dhéret (2014) states, this proves the comparative resilience of some EU 
countries, as for example Germany, with a strong industrial base to the economic 
recession. It demonstrates how important it is for a country to have a strong and 
“healthy” industry, specifically manufactures, not only to promote productivity 
growth, but to face periods of crisis. In contrast, in southern Europe the crisis has 
worsened the situation of countries like Spain, which initially already displayed a 
poor performance of manufacturing. The issue is not so much to attain an 
homogenous manufactures map through the EU, but in a context of existing 
heterogeneity in EU member states’ manufactures to achieve a strong and stable 
manufacturing base. To this end the design and implementation of strategic 
industrial policy measures at regional, national and EU level becomes a key factor to 
attain a broad and diversified manufacturing base. 
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At the end of the crisis and in front of the persistence of the difficulties to improve 
labour productivity performance in manufacturing, still a great number of authors 
are devoted to examine the causes of it. Recent studies (Strobel, 2012; Mas et al., 
2012; Timmer et al., 2011; Timmer et al 2010; Hao et al., 2009) have tried to find 
explanations to the declining trend of labour productivity growth in EU countries 
over the last two decades. They are not mutually exclusive and range from lower 
growth contributions from investment in information and communication 
technology, R&D and innovation, the relatively small share of technology–
producing industries, the investment in intangible assets, the competition and slower 
multifactor productivity growth (viewed as a proxy for advances in technology and 
innovation).  
 
The findings of many of these authors coincide in the established view that the 
growing role of ICT and continued improvements in human capital are important 
drivers of labour productivity growth. But despite the apparent importance of the 
“knowledge economy” macroeconomic performance appears unaffected: 
investment rates are flat and labour productivity has slowed.  
 
In response, several studies found evidence that increased investment in intangible 
assets explain a large share of the unexplained labour productivity growth and thus 
for economic growth (Corrado et al., 2005, 2006, 2009; Marrano and Haskel, 2006; 
Van Rooijen-Horsten et al., 2008; Fukao et al., 2009; Hao et al., 2009; Marrano et al., 
2009; Mc Morrow et al., 2010; Edquist, 2011; Strobel, 2012). 
 
The changing nature of the global economy has placed a novel attention on 
intangible capital as a new source of growth (Muntean, 2014; Dal Borgo et al., 2013; 
Goodridge et al., 2013 and Jona-Lasinio et al., 2011). The structural and 
technological changes associated with the rapid progress in ICT, the rising role of 
the service sector and the emergence of new business models made intangible 
investment a key element of global competition.  
 
Corrado et al. (2005) were one of the first authors to prove that intangible capital is 
an essential driver of economic growth. They extended the standard growth 
accounting model to identify the contribution of intangible capital to economic 
growth. The findings showed that it is a main driver of labour productivity growth 
and an important contributor to capital deepening. But the problem is that it is 
being treated as current expense in the national accounts rather than as an 
investment. Consequently, this results in an understatement of investment in the 
economy providing a partial picture of the main sources of growth. 
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After the Great Recession, many countries are troubled about their economic 
growth performance, this leads policy makers to look for solutions which are mainly 
focused on new sources of economic growth and employment creation. Some 
countries are concerned about their unbalanced economic growth with some sectors 
declining excessively and others taking too strong a role in overall economic growth. 
In other countries the concerns are about a decline in manufacturing production, 
the loss of opportunities in catching up with ICT technologies and knowledge. All 
this explains the resurgence of a renewed interest in manufacturing industry and for 
the so-called new industrial policy. Countries require industrial policy measures that 
address concrete needs, promote technologies and investment in strategic industrial 
manufacturing branches in order to strengthen them (European Commission, 2014). 
This change is also explained by some strong evidence showing that manufacturing 
is an essential pillar of the economy as "additional final demand in manufacturing 
generates around half as much additional final demand elsewhere in the economy" 
(European Competitiveness Report, 2013).  
 
The former is sustained by the fact that manufacturing industry is considered the 
core driver of economic growth - in 2012, the European Commission published a 
new industrial policy communication, which starts from the premise that “Europe 
needs industry” (European Commission, 2012). Identifying the right policies to 
support the manufacturing sector’s contribution to Europe’s future growth requires 
an understanding of the changing role of manufacturing industry in Europe’s 
growth agenda. In this context it is important to implement both homogeneous as 
well as country-specific industrial policy measures for the EU member states aiming 
a stable and balanced performance of economic growth. 
 
Against this background and as long as labour productivity in manufacturing is one 
of the main sources of economic growth and competitiveness (Veugelers, 2013; 
European Competitiveness Report, 2013; Mas et al., 2012), the objective of the 
present thesis is to analyze the underperformance of labour productivity growth in 
manufacturing in EU member states and the existence of persistent differences 
among them in the last decades. As a consequence, this turns out in regional 
disparities within EU which results in the so-called “center-periphery”, “east-west” 
or “north-south” pattern (Petrakos et al., 2011), referring to more and less advanced 
areas. The importance of industrial structures is widely recognized, although the 
potential of industrial policy measures to modify that structure remains discussed 
(Crafts, 2010 and Owen, 2012). Industrial policy measures have not been always 
successful when they seek to alter the production structure towards branches that 
are expected to offer better results in terms of labour productivity growth 
(European Competitiveness Report, 2013). This opens a door to the debate about 
the objectives and tools of EU industrial policy. The aim is to know the factors 
Chapter 1 
?
7 
 
responsible for this poor performance that hinders a recovering from the Great 
Recession. This would allow designing industrial policy measures to improve the 
behaviour of labour productivity growth. 
 
The motivation is threefold, first we determine and assess the magnitude of labour 
productivity differences as well as the role of industry specialization in explaining 
these differences. 
 
Secondly, to deepen the analysis, we investigate if the differences in labour 
productivity and its persistence arise from different production structures, if it is a 
problem of productivity differences itself or a combination of both. The existence 
of different production structures would explain the presence of differentiated 
production systems that may have led to different regional growth patterns.  
 
Thirdly, as long as the benefits of modern knowledge differ greatly between 
advanced economies, we want to examine the contribution of investment in 
intangible assets to labour productivity growth in manufacturing. Intangible assets 
are considered as knowledge capital, so if we take into account that knowledge is 
one of the main drivers of economic growth and competitiveness it is interesting to 
examine their influence on labour productivity performance (Corrado et al., 2014; 
Falk, 2013; Baldwin et al., 2012;). The purpose is to identify which single or 
combinations of intangible assets’ investment are essential drivers of labour 
productivity growth.  
 
To obtain an answer for our objective becomes key in helping to design strategic 
industrial policy measures aiming to improve the performance of labour 
productivity growth, economic growth and competitiveness. 
 
1.2. Objectives 
Taking into account the previous exposition, the main objective of the present 
thesis is to analyze the underperformance of labour productivity growth in 
manufacturing in EU member states and the existence of persistent differences 
among them in the last decades in comparison to behaviour of other advanced 
economies as United States (Timmer et al., 2010). In order to find out the 
weaknesses that deprives from recovering from the crisis that started in 2008.  
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This objective can be decomposed into three sub-objectives. So first, we conduct a 
comparative analysis of differences in labour productivity growth in manufacturing 
and next, we try to find out if the differences in labour productivity are due to 
changes in the industrial structure, to labour productivity deficiencies itself or a 
combination of both. Finally, in the context where knowledge is an important driver 
of economic growth and competitiveness in advanced economies, and as intangible 
assets are considered as “knowledge capital” (Falk, 2013), we examine the role of 
investment in intangible assets as contributor to labour productivity growth. The 
purpose is to identify which intangible assets contribute most to labour productivity 
growth. 
 
As said before manufacturing in Europe has been divided in a “centre” and in a 
“periphery”, this is indicative for existence of a differentiated production model in 
manufacturing in southern and northern Europe. For this reason, we think it may be 
interesting to center the analysis of labour productivity in manufacturing on the 
“centre” and the “periphery” of the EU and more concretely in two benchmark 
member states representing each one. With this aim, in the next two chapters of the 
thesis we will take Germany as benchmark for the “centre” and Spain for the 
“periphery”. So, analysis in the first and in the second part of the dissertation is 
focused on Germany and Spain, but the results and conclusions obtained can be 
extended to the EU member states belonging to the “centre” and the “periphery”. 
Furthermore, in chapter 4 we implement an analysis in two steps, first considering 
the whole set of 9 EU member states and, second, dividing the sample into two 
groups. In both cases, the aim is deepen in the analysis in order to find an answer 
for the differentiated behaviour that allows to identify the investment in different 
intangible assets types the contribute most to labour productivity growth. In doing 
so, it might permit to discriminate between industrial policy measures addressing 
specific characteristics of each group and measures at EU level. This would result in 
greater efficacy and efficiency in the consecution of the aimed objectives.  
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organised in four chapters. This section presents a summary 
of the three chapters that make up the main body of the present thesis. Each one 
coincides with each specific objective which purpose is to provide an answer to the 
main question of the thesis. The thesis ends with chapter 5 where the main 
conclusions and future research are presented. 
 
 
Chapter 1 
?
9 
 
Chapter 2: An Analysis of Differences in Labour Productivity in Manufacturing. 
Displaying the need for a resurgence of industrial policy: Spain vs Germany, 1993-
2007 
 
In chapter 2, in order to find out if differences in productivity arise mainly from 
distinct production structures, if they are mainly due to an intrinsic problem of the 
industrial productivity itself or a combination of both of them, a comparative 
analysis of industrial labour productivity between Spain and Germany in the pre 
crisis period between 1993 and 2007 is undertaken. As said before, Spain and 
Germany are chosen as benchmark countries, for the “periphery” and for the 
“centre”, respectively. The objective is to know which are the main factors 
preventing the continued labour productivity growth in Spanish manufacturing, 
impeding the recovery of the present crisis. Bearing this in mind, we want to 
determine the existence of differences between Spanish and German manufacturing 
labour productivity, to assess its magnitude and the role of industry specialization. 
Results indicate that it is mainly a problem of productivity itself. To a less extent 
industry specialization plays a little role, although its influence is increasing. The 
main contribution of that chapter is that the differences in labour productivity can 
be mainly attributed to productivity itself and not so much to manufacturing 
industry structure differences. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Labour productivity and Industrial Specialization 
 
In order to advance in the comparative analysis of manufacturing labour 
productivity between Spain and Germany in the period 1993-2007 already started in 
chapter 2, the objective of this chapter is to investigate the sources of the persisting 
differences. To identify if they can be attributed to changes in the sectoral structure 
or to differences in productivity itself between sectors may help in finding an 
answer. So we implement an analysis from two complementary perspectives in order 
to obtain a more complete explanation. It consists of decomposing aggregate 
productivity differences into different sources, but each implementing a different 
methodology. Here again results confirm that it is mainly an intrinsic problem of 
productivity differences, but we have obtained information of the magnitude. 
Manufacturing’s specialization is becoming an influencing variable, although to a 
lesser degree. The main contribution of this chapter is that differences in industry 
structure do not totally justify the gap in productivity. It explains to what extent is 
Spain lagging behind Germany, displaying significant labour productivity 
differentials and showing difficulties to change its productive structure at a faster 
pace. 
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Chapter 4: The contribution of intangible assets to labour productivity growth in 
manufacturing industries in EU member states, 1995-2010. 
 
As long as intangible capital is considered a main component of knowledge playing 
an important role as driver of labour productivity growth, the aim of this chapter is 
to investigate the contribution to labour productivity growth of investment in 
different single intangible asset types in this case. The analysis is implemented for 
manufacturing taking a sample of 9 European member states between 1995 and 
2010. We have extended the sample in order to provide higher variability and 
richness to the study resulting from the different characteristics of the countries 
considered and also to overcome the reduced availability of more detailed 
information for Spain and Germany. With the purpose of identifying the existence 
of a differentiated behaviour in terms of labour productivity growth and intangibles’ 
investment, we split the sample into two groups. If affirmative, this would permit to 
define more concrete industrial policy measures addressing each group resulting in a 
better labour productivity performance. Results indicate that it is reasonable. The 
main findings can be summarized as follows: all the considered intangible assets are 
significant for labour productivity growth except for software in both groups; and for 
R&D in group 1. Vocational training and advertising & marketing are the ones which 
contribute individually most to labour productivity growth. The implications of 
these findings for the design of industrial policy measures are that common 
measures should be combined with specific ones focusing on the particular needs in 
terms of intangibles investment of each country. This chapter is a contribution to 
the literature of investment in intangibles due to the fact that identifies which of the 
different intangibles are the main drivers of labour productivity growth in EU 
member states in manufacturing, between 1995 and 2010, shows the existence of 
heterogeneous effects of investment in intangibles in the considered EU sample and 
its implications for industrial policy in European Union.  
 
 
Chapter 5: Concluding remarks and future research 
 
This chapter 5 contains the main findings and conclusions the conclusions drawn 
from empirical analysis for each of the objectives are presented, highlighting the 
main contributions and limitations arising there from and future research with the 
intention of overcoming, enhance and project the present work. 
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Chapter 2: An analysis of  differences in labour 
productivity.1 
2.1. Introduction 
The crisis which started in 2008 is affecting most countries with different levels of 
intensity. Although it started in the financial sector, its impact has spread 
throughout the whole economy. Since the early 1990s the European Union 
economy has gone through two business cycles and is now in the downward phase 
of a third one. The troughs of the manufacturing cycles in EU occurred first in 1993 
and then at the end of 2001. They were characterised by negative growth rates in 
manufacturing output. But in some countries the situation has been exacerbated by 
pre-existing low sectoral performance (European Commission, 2009). That seems to 
be the case with Spain. Joining the European Union (EU) in 1986 played at least an 
important role in shaping Spain into what it is today (Mas et al., 2012). It benefited 
from the inflow of funds of the EU, which contributed definitively to Spanish 
economic growth and to its modernization. Consequently, one would have expected 
a better performance and a faster recovery of Spanish economy in front of the 
recent economic crisis. Spain’s recovery patterns seem to be mostly affected not 
only by macroeconomic imbalances, but also by its difficulty to improve internal 
competitiveness. 
 
As long as labour productivity is one of the drivers of internal competitiveness, this 
chapter focuses on its performance. In particular, we conduct a comparative analysis 
of industrial labour productivity between Spain and Germany in the previous years 
of the crisis, 1993-2007. As said in the Introduction two great groups of member 
states can be identified, one displaying a weaker manufacturing base – “periphery”- 
and another one with a stronger manufacturing base – “centre”. In our analysis 
Spain is representative for the “periphery” and Germany for the “centre”. The 
purpose is to identify the determinants that hinder the continued growth of 
productivity in Spanish industry, depriving from recovering of the present crisis. To 
this end, we aim to determine the existence of differences between industrial 
productivity in Spain and Germany, to assess its magnitude and the role of industry 
specialization. The motivation is to find out if differences in productivity arise 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation have been merged into one article that has been accepted for 
publication in Hacienda Pública Española/Review of Public Economics, 212-(1/2015), 97-126. 
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mainly from distinct production structures, if they are mainly due to an intrinsic 
problem of the industrial productivity itself or a combination of both of them. 
There is now a vast amount of literature focusing on the explanation and impacts of 
the economic crisis at the macroeconomical level, with little emphasis on the 
sectoral patterns in relation to structural change and sectoral productivity growth 
(Martínez Álvarez, et al., 2013 and Timmer et al., 2011).  
 
The results confirm that it is mainly an intrinsic problem of productivity itself. 
Industry specialization is becoming an influencing variable, although to a lesser 
degree. So, the main contribution of this chapter is that differences in industry 
structure do not totally justify the gap in productivity.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After the introduction, the 
second section contains a brief description of the dataset. The third section 
describes the evolution of German and Spanish per capita gross value added (from 
now on GVApc) for the whole economy and for manufacturing. The aim is to see if 
both countries converge in total and in industrial GVApc, reducing their gap. 
Furthermore, in order to assess if labour productivity is one of the main 
determinants of GVApc, we undertake the decomposition of GVApc (Raymond 
and Garcia-Greciano, 1994; Lladós-Masllorens, 2002; Mas et al., 2012). The results 
confirm that differences in productivity are significant and persistent in the 
considered time period. The fourth section is devoted to the analysis of the 
productive structure in each country and of the differences in their composition.?To 
this end, we proceed to calculate an index of structural inequality that will conclude 
whether or not there has been a convergence between the two production 
structures. Section 2.5 summarizes the main findings and conclusions. 
2.2. Data 
To carry out this study we use the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 
(henceforth EUKLEMS; http://www.euklems.net)2 which contain internationally 
comparable data for output and inputs. This database includes a wide range of 
measures on output growth, employment, skill creation, capital formation and multi-
factor productivity at the industrial level for EU member states from 1970 until 
2007.  
 
As Timmer et al. (2007a and 2007b) states the main advantage of EU KLEMS 
database is that it allows going beyond the aggregate level of economy to analyse the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 More detailed explanation on the methodology followed to define and to obtain the variables is 
contained in http://www.euklems.net.  
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productivity performance of individual industries and their contribution to aggregate 
growth.  
 
The data used in this paper covers the period from 1993 to 2007 for Spain and 
Germany. In all figures, tables and formulae E stands for Spain and Ger for 
Germany. Our analysis is implemented both at aggregate level as well as for 
individual branches of manufacturing industry. The dataset used here consists of 23 
goods-producing industries that correspond to the 2-digit ISIC Revision 3.0. For a 
list of industries, see table 2.A.1. 
 
Data on Population (P) and Labour force (LF) are obtained from Eurostat, both are 
annual averages expressed in millions. Labour force is defined as population in 
working age between 15 and 64 years and is necessary to compute the rate of 
employment and the rate of activity of the whole economy (in the next section). The 
rest of variables used in this paper are provided by EUKLEMS. Our output 
measure is gross value added at basic prices 1995=100, labour productivity is 
defined in terms of hours worked as well as all the variables needed for the analysis, 
where appropriate. All monetary variables are expressed in Euros 1995 =100.  
2.3. Main sources of Gross Value Added per Capita in Manufacturing  
In this section we examine the following aspects: on the one hand, if differences in 
per capita income of the Spanish and German total economy have become less and 
if this is also the case for manufactures between 1993 and 2007.  
 
On the other hand, we examine whether or not labour productivity per hour is one 
of the main determinants of differences in gross value added per capita among 
manufacturing industries in Spain and Germany. Furthermore, in order to check if 
differences in labour productivity between Spain and Germany are significant and 
persistent in time, we will carry out a static and a dynamic analysis.  
 
With this aim, we take as a reference a rather useful decomposition of per capita 
income, which have been applied by several authors such as Raymond and García-
Greciano (1994), Lladós-Masllorens (2002) and Mas et al. (2012): 
 
 ?
??
??
?
?
?
?
???
???
???
?
??? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?? ???? ?  (2.1) 
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where GVAT stands for gross value added of the total economy; P for total 
population and LF represents the labour force of total economy, that is the 
population of working ages from 16 to 65. GVAI for gross value added in the 
manufacturing industry; HI is total hours worked; LI is total employment (in 
people). All these variables are related to manufactures (denoted with subindex I).  
 
Therefore, the term on the left-hand side of (2.1) measures per capita income of 
total economy which can be decomposed into five ratios displayed on the right-
hand side. These are as follows: the first one is per capita income of total economy 
over per capita income of manufacturing (GVAT/GVAI) which indicates to what 
extend total economy value-added is determined by manufactures’ value added; the 
second one (GVAI/H = LP) measures labour productivity in terms of hours 
worked; the third one (HI/LI) total hours worked per employed person; the fourth 
one (LI/LF) the employment rate and the last component (LF/P) is the activity 
rate. 
 
Let us start by examining briefly the left hand-side part of equation (2.1). Figure 2.1 
displays the evolution of GVAT/P in both countries, in it we can appreciate the gap 
and its persistence between Spain and Germany. Although data contained in table 
2.1 panel (c) row (1) indicate a slight approximation: in 1993 the ratio between 
Spain’s and Germany’s GVAT/P was 50.8% and increased in 2007 up to 55.8%, 
from this we can conclude that it did not alter the trend of the Spanish per capita 
income. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the differences between Spain and Germany each for per capita 
income of total economy and of manufacturing taking 1993 =100. As long as per 
capita income, both for the whole economy and for manufactures, display a similar 
growth pattern with small differences, this can be interpreted in the sense that the 
total economy’s per capita income performance is determined mainly by the 
manufacturing sector. Looking at figure 2.2 we can appreciate that other sectors 
different from manufactures are the drivers of the total economy’s per capita 
income. 
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Figure12.1. GVA per Capita in total Economy. Germany and Spain, 1993-2007 
Millions of euros 1995 =100 
 
GVAT/PGer               GVAT/PE 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net, Eurostat, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/database and own 
calculations. 
 
Figure22.2. GVA per Capita decomposition. Spain minus Germany 
Differences 1993 = 100 
 
GVAT/P                    GVAI/P 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net Eurostat, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/database and own 
calculations. 
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In figure 2.2 it can be appreciated how differences in GVAI/P between Spain and 
Germany are rapidly increasing whereas the gap in GVAT/P is growing slower. 
Specifically from 2002 onwards the manufactures’ per capita income differences 
started to soar. The same happened to the GVAT/P a little later but with less 
intensity. 
 
Data in table 2.1 show that the slight approximation in total economy per capita 
income can’t be attributed to manufactures’ productivity because ratios decreased, at 
the beginning of the period this ratio was 64.1% and at the end 49.2% (table 2.1. 
panel (c) row (3)). In the whole period Spanish GVAT/P grows at an average annual 
rate of 2.3% while Germany’s rate is 1.6% (table 2 panels (a) and (b)). This faster 
growth of the Spanish economy does not shorten the distance in relation to 
Germany, on the contrary, the difference in GVAT/P has become greater. Looking 
at its performance in the three subperiods (table 2.1 panel (c) row 1 columns 7 to 9), 
it can be appreciated that Spain’s growth rates are approximately 54-68% higher 
than the German ones, except for the subperiod of 2003-2007. The boom of the 
Spanish construction sector has played here a key role in boosting economic 
growth.  
 
The main reading of this behaviour is that Spain seems to have neglected its 
manufacturing industry in terms of investments in technological capital in key 
sectors and also in human capital. This may explain why now obviously the Spanish 
manufacturing industry is not able to generate value added at the same rate as the 
German one. That means the German manufacturing industry has undergone the 
necessary adjustments in contrast to Spain, which seems as if it is not able to 
overcome historical problems and thus lost weight in the overall economy (see also 
table 2.1). 
 
And now let examine the right-hand-side of expression (2.1) that is to analyze the 
sources of differences in gross value added per capita in manufacturing industries. 
At first we will look at the status quo at the beginning and at the end of the 
considered period in order to compare both and also to assess the differences 
among both industries. Afterwards we study the variables’ evolution that is from a 
dynamic point of view. 
 
Table 2.1 presents the contribution of each component of (2.1) in levels for the 
years 1993 and 2007, as well as their growth rates for 1993-2007. In panel (a) and (b) 
we have the figures for each industry and in panel (c) we can see the ratio Spain over 
Germany (that is (a)/(b)) in percentage. The data show that the differences between 
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the two countries are substantial and confirm that labour productivity is one of the 
main drivers of per capita income together with the number of hours worked per 
employed person (HI/LI) in both industries in the whole period. Furthermore both 
manufacturing industries show a considerable dispersion among the variables and 
the subperiods. Differences in labour productivity increases its importance, while 
number of hours worked reduces it. The behaviour of the rest of variables plays a 
little role in industrial per capita income.  
 
In table 2.1 panels (a) and (b), we can see that not only German values are 
significantly higher than the Spanish ones, but the gap between both industries has 
increased, displaying a persistent trend (panel c). Germany’s productivity grows at 
3.5% while Spain only at a 1.6%, showing a sluggish behaviour in contributing to 
value added growth (table 2.1 panels (a) and (b)). This reflects the greater capacity of 
German industry to generate value added. This ability can be explained either by an 
increased production efficiency, by a greater qualification of human capital, by a 
larger stock of capital (it incorporates more technical progress) or a combination of 
all these factors. Taking a look at the weights of the different variables (table 2.1 
panel (c)) that intervene in decomposition, we see that all of the Spanish 
components have lost weight in relation to Germany considering the whole period. 
The only exception is the employment rate and to a less extent the activity rate. In 
contrast, we appreciate a slight approximation in per capita income of total 
economy, which cannot be attributed to manufactures as figures in table 2.1 show. 
 
In fact, if we look at the employment rate in both industries, they are similar, though 
somewhat smaller in Spain. This is indicative of less specialization of the Spanish 
economy in the industrial sector. The total number of hours worked per engaged 
person in Spanish industry is slightly larger than the German, while the employment 
rate is a bit smaller. There are engaged persons working in the Spanish industry, but 
they work more hours than their German counterparts. Thus one would expect then 
a higher industrial value added than observed. A possible explanation for this fact is 
that in Spain the proportion of hours worked in the industrial sector in relation to 
total hours worked in all sectors of production is lower than in Germany. This lower 
relative importance of the manufacturing sector in the Spanish economy, along with 
a reduced ability to generate value added and a lower productivity show that Spanish 
industry suffers inefficiencies that prevent to progress at the same rate as the 
German industry. 
 
The figures analyzed allow us to answer the first question posed, productivity is one 
of the main factors explaining the gap between the Spanish and German per capita 
income as well as to confirm the hypothesis of the existence of significant 
differences in productivity between Spanish and German industries.  
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This was the situation at different concrete moments of the period examined, 1993, 
1999, 2003 and 2007. But which has been the evolution between 1993 and 2007 and 
different subperiods: 1993-1998, 1999-2002 and 2003-2007? The variables for these 
subperiods (table 2.1) are expressed in percentage average annual growth rates. The 
aim is to confirm the significance and persistence of the differences between Spain 
and Germany.  
 
From this table, we can see that over the whole period both countries show 
significant dispersion in their growth rates, particularly Germany. In the subperiods, 
labour productivity is still one the main variables explaining the performance of 
GVAT/P in manufacturing. In the period 1993-1998 both GVAT/P and 
employment in Spain grew at a very fast rate, while in Germany both variables 
showed a sluggish pace. At this point it’s important to say that Germany’s industry 
is undertaking an adjustment mainly due to German reunification, which lasts 
approximately from 1993 to 2002. Subperiod 1999 to 2002 is characterized by a 
slowdown in productivity and the rest of determinants of per capita income. This 
trend is not only maintained but worsened in the case of Spanish industry with the 
exception of labour productivity in the last subperiod, 2003-2007. On the contrary 
Germany increases its per capita gross value added and labour productivity 
significantly, while the other determinants show a slight improvement. Spain 
presents a very poor performance in labour productivity although the severe 
employment destruction in the last subperiod. 
 
Figure 2.3 displays the differences between Germany and Spain taking 1993 =100. 
The most striking fact is how from 1993 on up to 2007 the gap in labour 
productivity grows at a rapid pace. Its performance confirms again that it is one of 
the main determinants of the differences in per capita income in manufacturing and 
that these differences are persistent. 
 
Summarising, labour productivity is one of the most important factor explaining 
differences in industrial per capita income between both countries, that they are 
significant and persistent in the whole period 1993-2007. The rest of the 
components show no major differences.  
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Figure32.3. GVApc, Labour Productivity and Number of Hours Worked by 
Engaged Person. Spain minus Germany, 1993-2007 
Differences 1993 = 100 
 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations. 
 
2.4. Changes in Manufacturing Specialization 
Up to now, we have seen that there are no signs indicating a reduction of the gap in 
manufacturing labour productivity between Spain and Germany from 1993 to 2007. 
The question posed in this section is if the differences in the manufacturing industry 
specialization among both countries justify the existing differences in manufacturing 
labour productivity. To this end, we implement two kind of analysis. Firstly, we start 
by focusing on the productive structure in each country and then we compare them 
looking at the differences in their composition. To this aim we make use of two 
indexes (Pérez García et al., 2006) to compute the share of each manufacturing 
branch value added in total manufacturing value added3. 
 
In this section we start analysing separately how the composition in the productive 
structure in terms of sectoral GVA over the total manufacturing GVA of the 
Spanish and the German manufactures has changed in the considered time period, 
that is from 1993 up to 2007. To this end, the weight of each manufacturing branch 
in total manufacturing in terms of value added is computed. What we want to check 
is if these manufacturing industries have changed its productive structure 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3 The same exercise has been replicated using sectoral labour’s share with similar qualitative results. 
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composition from low-performing productivity branches to high-performing ones 
in the considered period, 
 
Then the next step is to compare them in order to see to which extent they have 
similar productive structures or no. So, if a country’s manufacturing industry 
displays a higher weight of high-performing productivity sectors than the other one, 
this would mean that the first country is more competitive and more capable to 
generate value added.  
 
Firstly, we compare the compositional differences between the same manufacturing 
sector at two points in time (t = 0 and t= T) using a structural change index L0T. 
This provides us information about the presence of changes in the productive 
structure of each manufacturing industry. According to Pérez García et al. (2006), 
L0T index is defined, as follows: 
 
 ????
?
?
?? ??? ?
?
?
?
???? ???  (2.2) 
 
where Xj0 is the weight of sector j in total manufactures in the initial period 0 and 
Xjt is the weight of sector j in total manufactures in the final period T. The index L0T 
measures therefore the magnitude of change of sectoral specialization between these 
two periods and takes larger values, the more intense the change. Specifically, the 
index is bounded between 0 and 100 and expresses in terms of percentages the 
changes in the composition of production.  
 
Secondly, we compare both manufacturing structures to see if they show up 
differences among them and, if affirmative, to detect whether there has been an 
approach between them or not in the considered period.  
 
To this end, we compute the index of differences in manufactures’ composition 
(LAB) which is identical to L0T but referred to two industries, A and B, in the same 
period. It is computed according to (2.3): 
 
 ????
?
?
??? ?
?
?
?
?????? ???  (2.3) 
 
In (2.3) XjA is the weight of sector j in total manufactures A at a given moment of 
time and XjB is the corresponding value for sector j in manufactures B. LAB index is 
bounded between 0 and 100 and measures the magnitude of the differences in 
sectoral specialization between manufactures A and B. It takes larger values, the 
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lower the similarity. In this analysis, country A is Spain (E) and B is Germany (Ger), 
so henceforth LAB will be LE-Ger. 
 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 each offer an overview of the behaviour of both indexes, 
respectively L0T (L0TGer for Germany and L0TE for Spain) and LE-Ger. In particular, 
figure 2.4 shows the performance of structural change index L0TE for Spain and 
L0TGer for Germany, here we observe that both manufacturing industries show a 
great variability, indicating that both have implemented changes in its production 
composition. But the small values of the index L0T indicate that they haven’t been 
significant. Figure 2.5 displays the evolution of the index of differences in 
manufactures’ composition LE-Ger, in it we can appreciate how the differences 
between Spain and Germany have grown from 21.6% to 25.7%. More concretely, 
the declining trend of the index of differences in manufactures’ composition LE-Ger, 
changes with the entrance in force of the Economic and Monetary Union (EUM), 
since that moment differences in manufacturing composition start growing. 
 
Figure42.4. Structural change index L0T 
Annual growth rates in % 
 
 
L0TGer      L0TE 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations. 
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Figure52.5. Index of differences in industries’ composition, L E-Ger. 
In percentages 
 
 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations. 
 
Figure62.6. Ratio Labour Productivity Spain/Germany (in %) 1993 and 2007 
 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations 
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Table22.2. Labour Productivity. Spain - Germany, 1993-2007 
1993(a) 1999(a) 2003(a) 2007(a) 
1993-
2007(b) 
1993-
1998(b) 
1999-
2002(b) 
2003-
2007(b) 
a) Spain 
TOTAL 17.0 18.7 19.7 21.2 1.6 1.5 0.9 1.9 
FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 19.5 18.3 19.4 17.3 -0.9 -1.5 1.4 -2.9 
TEXTILES, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 11.6 11.1 11.3 13.0 0.8 -0.8 0.6 3.6 
WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK 11.1 12.4 11.6 13.5 1.4 1.6 -2.4 3.9 
PULP, PAPER, PRINTING AND PUBL. 21.4 21.9 24.3 26.6 1.6 -0.4 2.5 2.3 
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PROD. 27.5 32.0 33.7 33.8 1.5 2.7 1.1 0.0 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS 22.7 22.8 23.3 24.7 0.6 -0.4 -0.5 1.5 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL 19.6 21.8 22.6 25.7 2.0 1.9 0.0 3.2 
BASIC METALS & FABRICATED METAL 17.5 19.1 19.9 21.4 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.8 
MACHINERY, NEC 17.4 20.0 21.4 22.4 1.8 2.6 1.1 1.1 
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIP 17.0 21.0 22.4 25.3 2.8 4.1 0.7 3.1 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 14.7 22.6 21.7 26.0 4.1 7.9 -2.4 4.4 
MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 10.0 11.1 11.4 12.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 2.7 
b) Germany 
TOTAL 26.6 32.1 36.1 43.2  3.5 3.4 2.8 4.5 
FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 20.8 22.4 22.0 22.7 0.6 0.8 -0.4 0.8 
TEXTILES, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 18.5 21.8 26.4 31.7 3.8 3.3 4.7 4.6 
WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK 19.5 22.7 27.7 28.6 2.7 2.6 4.5 0.8 
PULP, PAPER, PRINTING AND PUBL. 25.2 31.5 30.1 34.9 2.3 4.0 -1.9 3.7 
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PROD. 37.8 53.0 66.0 86.1 5.9 6.0 6.4 6.6 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS 28.6 32.0 35.0 43.0 2.9 2.4 2.6 5.1 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL 27.8 34.4 39.5 44.7 3.4 3.4 2.3 3.1 
BASIC METALS & FABRICATED METAL 26.4 31.6 33.9 35.1 2.0 3.1 1.8 0.9 
MACHINERY, NEC 27.0 32.5 34.3 39.0 2.6 4.5 2.7 3.2 
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIP 28.3 33.3 41.1 59.7 5.3 1.4 3.2 9.3 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 33.5 39.4 48.2 58.8 4.0 3.5 4.7 4.9 
MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 20.0 22.6 22.0 21.2  0.4 2.5 -0.7 -1.0 
(c) Ratio Spain/Germany (in %) 
TOTAL 64.1 58.4 64.8 49.2  45.4 44.1 33.2 43.1 
FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 93.6 81.7 88.1 76.0  -136.8 -177.6 -316.2 -375.6 
TEXTILES, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 62.7 51.1 42.8 41.1 21.5 -23.5 12.8 77.7 
WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK 57.2 54.5 41.7 47.2 50.0 61.5 -53.0 501.9 
PULP, PAPER, PRINTING AND PUBL. 84.8 69.6 80.7 76.2 67.0 -11.1 -127.5 61.6 
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PROD. 72.7 60.5 51.1 39.3 25.2 44.5 17.6 0.6 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS 79.6 71.4 66.4 57.5 20.3 -18.0 -18.5 29.3 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL 70.4 63.4 57.2 57.6 57.8 54.3 1.7 105.2 
BASIC METALS & FABRICATED METAL 66.2 60.4 58.8 61.0 71.5 38.3 72.9 203.9 
MACHINERY, NEC 64.3 61.7 62.4 57.4 69.2 57.4 42.2 35.4 
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIP. 60.1 63.1 54.5 42.4 53.2 288.7 23.8 32.7 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 43.8 57.3 45.0 44.2 101.6 225.7 -51.0 90.0 
MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 49.9 49.0 51.9 60.1 421.3 70.0 -180.9 -270.5 
Notes: (a) Thousands Euro per Hour; (b) Average annual growth rate in %.  
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations.? ?
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The main conclusion is that Spain has not undergone significant changes in its 
composition of production, concentrating its production in less productive branches 
which are thus less exposed to competence in comparison to Germany. This is 
confirmed in terms of labour productivity in figure 2.6 and table 2.2, the data 
indicates that particularly traditional productive activities intensive in labour, as 
Food, beverages and tobacco and Textiles, leather and footwear, display a significant 
drop in labour productivity. Despite the fact that between 1993 and 2007 the rate of 
employment in Spain increased significantly and that capital accumulation was an 
important contributor of value added (Mas et al., 2012; Pérez et al., 2006), Spanish 
manufacturing shows little ability to generate value added and an unfavourable 
manufacturing’s specialization. In fact, Spain displays a higher average growth rate 
of capital services (3.0%) than Germany (1.2%)4 in the considered period. This 
indicates that it is not mainly a matter of factors’ accumulation, but of a poor labour 
productivity performance. 
 
Figure 2.6 displays the ratio of labour productivity between Spain and Germany for 
1993 and for 2007 for each manufacturing branch. In all branches Spain loses 
weight in front of Germany, particularly in high and medium performing 
productivity branches as Chemicals and Chemical Products and Electrical and 
Optical Equipment. The ratio is remains unchanged in Transport Equipment and 
increases in Manufacturing NEC; Recycling. This behaviour reinforces the above 
mentioned conclusions. Having a look at table 2.2 panel (c) data show how the 
labour productivity ratio between Spain and Germany has decreased between 1993 
and 2007, from 64% to 49%. Spanish labour productivity has lost weight in relation 
to the German one, despite having grown at annual rate of 1.6% in the considered 
period, it doesn’t achieve to approach the German growth rate (3.5%). Although 
Spain manufacturing industry is still focused on medium to low technology 
branches, it is not able to achieve a sustainable productivity growth also in these 
branches (for example see Textiles, leather and footwear, Basic metals and 
fabricated metallic products). The data reveal how Spanish manufactures are still 
mainly specialized less technology intensive sectors, which have exhausted their 
advantages and need to develop new strategies to increase their competitiveness 
(Trullén, 2007). So new strategies are needed to promote improve labour 
productivity performance in high and medium technology manufacturing branches 
like Transport equipment (Aerospace), Chemicals and Chemical Products and 
Electrical and Optical Equipment. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4 EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations. 
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2.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have analyzed the sources in labour productivity differences 
between the Spanish and German manufacturing industry in the period 1993-2007. 
To this end we posed several questions in order to single out the factors that may 
determine this gap, taking Germany as the benchmark country. The first one was to 
confirm that the Spanish and German differences in per capita income of the total 
economy are reducing whereas on the contrary the one in manufacturing industry 
does not. Data shows that this is not the case: Spanish and German differences in 
per capita income of the total economy remained relatively stable until the last 
subperiod, when they started to increase (figure 2.2). Albeit the strong increase of 
the employment rate and of capital accumulation (Mas et al., 2012) in Spanish 
manufacturing in the considered period, the ability to generate value added remains 
low.  
 
Per capita income differences between Spanish and German manufacturing industry 
are growing, particularly in the last subperiod. Spanish per capita income in 
manufacturing industry is losing weight in relation to Germany. The gap between 
per capita income of the Spanish and German in total and manufacturing industry is 
increasing. Next, we carried out a decomposition analysis of per capita income in 
order to assess the influence of labour productivity The results obtained confirmed 
that not only that the differences in productivity were one of the main determinants, 
but that they were also significant and persistent along the considered period.  
 
Differences in sectoral specialization could explain differences in productivity, and, 
in fact, our results have shown that Spain’s manufacturing industry is characterized 
as a traditional one, where low and medium technology branches generate the 
greatest part of value added. In contrast, in Germany the bulk is on the high and 
medium technology branches. Despite the investment in capital stock incorporating 
new and advanced technologies, the low skills of workers and the absence of 
adequate measures promoting human capital formation may explain this poor ability 
in generating value added (Corrado et al., 2014; Corrado et al., 2012; Mas et al., 2012, 
Timmer et al., 2010 and Pérez et al., 2006). Thus results point to the fact that labour 
productivity differences are not so much related to an issue of factors’ 
accumulation. Low skilled human capital implies lower absorptive capacity of 
workers and thus lower ability to benefit from new capital stock investments 
incorporating technical progress. In addition the low technological content of new 
employment created in manufacturing could be another determining factor 
explaining this behaviour. All this might explain why the impact job creation and 
increasing capital accumulation on labour productivity in Spain is scarce.  
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The results obtained in this chapter raise the question for a need of a change in 
industrial policy (Legarda and Hidalgo, 2011; Myro, 2012 and 2014; Trullén, 2007; 
Valero, 2013), specifically to implement strategies based on "focusing" in 
manufacturing industry branches of high knowledge economy or programs with a 
strong technological component (Martínez et al. 2014; Trullén, 2007). Spain’s 
manufacturing industry is still mainly specialized in medium to low-technology 
sectors. The specialization in low-technology sectors implies a lower propensity to 
innovation. The industrial strategy of the so-called European engines, such as 
France and Germany, postulates the increasing specialization in technology and 
knowledge intensive industries. This “focusing” strategy was followed in the past by 
Japan and the United States, and is behind the development of new technologies 
such as ICT, biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
 
The role of industrial policy is to rule changes in production and, in particular, to 
enable processes to substantially increase productivity. It is relevant to point out that 
the period between 1993 and 2007 was a time of less interventionism by the 
government and of a more industrial market driven policy. As noted by the 
European Commission (2005), the health of the manufacturing sector is essential 
for economic growth. In addition the industry has spillover effects that far outweigh 
the services, particularly regarding intermediate consumption. 
 
As a consequence of the economic crisis the Spanish government, in order to 
improve manufacturing labour productivity performance, is committed to generate 
qualified employment -of high-technological level-, to improve competitiveness in 
foreign markets and to increase the weight of the industrial sector, focusing mainly 
on manufactures, in national GDP (Martínez et al.; 2014;. Myro, 2014; Rodríguez, 
2012 and Trullén; 2007). 
 
Already in the period between 1993 and 2007 the proposed industrial policy in 
Spain aimed to support and implement these priorities, but as we can see in the 
present without obtaining a better performance of manufacturing labour 
productivity. Probably, this is due to the fact that it coincided with a time 
characterized by a less government’s interventionism and consequently the kind of 
industrial policy measures implemented. 
 
In order to promote labour productivity growth in Spanish manufacturing, there is a 
need for a resurgence of an active industrial policy. 
 
The results obtained may shed some light on why Spanish economy is showing up 
difficulties for recovering from the present crisis. This opens a door to new 
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questions on further determinants of aggregate productivity changes that will be 
explored in further research. 
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2.7. Appendix 2.A 
Table32.A.1. Industry taxonomy and ISIC classification 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own elaboration. 
 
 Branches ISIC classification revision 3.0 
1 Food and beverages 15 
2 Tobacco 16 
3 Textiles 17 
4 Wearing Apparel, Dressing And Dying Of Fur 18 
5 Leather, leather and footwear 19 
6 Wood and of wood and  cork 20 
7 Pulp, paper and paper 21 
8 Printing, publishing and reproduction 22 
9 Pharmaceuticals 244 
10 Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 24x 
11 Rubber and plastics 25 
12 Other non-metallic mineral 26 
13 Basic metals 27 
14 Fabricated metal 28 
15 Machinery, NEC 29 
16 Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 
17 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 31 
18 Radio, television and communication equipment 32 
19 Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 
20 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 
21 Other transport equipment 35 
22 Manufacturing nec 36 
23 Recycling 37 
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Chapter 3: Decomposition of  labour productivity: 
the role of  sectoral structure 
3.1. Introduction 
Up to now, we have seen that there are no signs indicating a reduction of the gap in 
manufacturing labour productivity between Spain and Germany from 1993 to 2007. 
The question posed in this section is if the differences in the manufacturing industry 
specialization among both countries justify the existing differences in manufacturing 
labour productivity. 
 
As said in chapter 2 since the early decade of the 1990s the European Union (EU) 
economy has gone through two business cycles and is now in the downward phase 
of a third one. First in 1993 and afterwards at the end of 2001 manufacturing cycles 
in EU suffered two troughs, displaying negative growth rates in manufacturing 
output. Particularly, in southern EU member states the situation has been 
exacerbated by pre-existing low sectoral performance (European Commission, 
2009), like in Spain.  
 
All this raises the question if governments can play a positive role in boosting their 
countries’ manufactures, especially high-performing productivity manufacturing 
branches, so now a growing number of authors are speaking of a resurgence and 
renewed interest in industrial policy (Dhéret, 2014; Pianta, 2013; O’Sullivan et al., 
2013; Crafts and Hughes, 2013 and Aghion et al., 2011). The role and design of 
industrial policy is being revisited intending to reinforce rather than mitigate the 
impact of competition policy and to provide useful guidelines for EU competition 
authorities.  
 
As in chapter 2 we continue our analysis focusing on two countries’ manufacturing 
industries representative each one of the periphery and the centre, respectively Spain 
and Germany. The results are intended to show the need to adopt industrial policy 
measures that promote high-performing productivity manufactures and also to 
provide information for its design and implementation in the future.  
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The objective of this chapter is to go a step further in the comparative analysis of 
manufacturing labour productivity between Spain and Germany in the previous 
years of the crisis, 1993-2007 in order to know the origins of the persisting 
differences. The motivation is to identify the causes of the productivity gap between 
the German and the Spanish manufacturing industries in the time period 1993-2007. 
With this aim we study whether they are due to changes in the sectoral structure or 
to differences in productivity itself between sectors. Thus we undertake an analysis 
from two complementary perspectives in order to go a step further. Both consist of 
a decomposition of aggregate productivity differences into different sources, but 
each implementing a different methodology with the aim to obtain a more complete 
explanation. The first one consists in decomposing these differences into a rate 
effect and a level effect in the same way as Fernández Casillas and Mate Rubio 
(1994) do. The second involves the decomposition of aggregate productivity 
differences into three explanatory components: structural change or industry mix5, 
productivity differential and allocative following the methodology of Esteban (1972, 
1994 and 2000) and will be computed in levels. 
 
Spanish manufacturing value added is losing weight in the total economy’s value 
added in the between 1993 and 2007 (table 3.1, panel (a) row 2: in1993 the ratio 
GVAT/GVAI represented 5.3% in front of 5.9% in 2007). That means the 
manufacturing industry is no longer the main driver of GVA in total economy. For 
sure the building industry became the main source of total economy’s GVA and 
employment growth in the Spanish economy during the expansion years. Almost all 
Spanish manufacturing industries experienced a very slow productivity growth. The 
absence of a more active industrial policy in this period has become clear, as well as 
the absence of measures aiming to control real estate loans. No doubt that the 
overfunding of the building industry had an opportunity cost in terms of the 
industrial and service sectors’ development. So, what it is required now is not only 
an active industrial policy, but one oriented towards high-performing productivity 
manufacturing industries, not just more manufactures. Thus there is a need for an 
industrial policy that meets these new requirements.  
 
The results confirm that it is mainly an intrinsic problem of productivity itself. 
Manufacturing industry’s specialization is becoming an influencing variable, 
although to a lesser degree. Thus the main contribution of this chapter is that 
differences in industry structure do not totally justify the gap in productivity.  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5 The terms industry mix, structural change or specialization component are equivalent and are used 
indistinctly in this paper and making reference to the manufacturing industry and not to the whole 
industry as in Esteban (1972 and 2000). 
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As said before, all this is indicative for the need to design and to implement a 
different industrial policy programmes in Spain. All in all, definitions of industrial 
policy have at their core a concern with economic growth, and especially with 
productivity growth. The general principles of industrial policy are simple enough. It 
should favour the evolution of knowledge, technologies and economic activities in 
directions that improve economic performances, social conditions and 
environmental sustainability (Callejón and García-Quevedo, 2011; García-Quevedo 
and Afcha, 2009 and Trullén, 2007).  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After the introduction, 
section 3.2 contains a brief description of the dataset. Section 3.3 and 3.4 are 
devoted to the analysis of labour productivity growth and industry specialization. To 
this end, we implement two types of analysis. The first one in Section 3.3, where we 
decompose labour productivity changes into rate and level effects, and the second 
one in section 3.4, we decompose those changes into the following three 
components: structural change or industry mix, productivity differential and 
allocative. Section 3.5 summarizes the main findings and conclusions. 
3.2. Data 
As in chapter 2 to carry out this analysis we use the EU KLEMS Growth and 
Productivity Accounts (henceforth EUKLEMS; http://www.euklems.net) which 
contain internationally comparable data for output and inputs. So the same 
explanations on the database are valid for the present is chapter, for this reason we 
do not reproduce them here.  
 
The data used in this chapter covers the period from 1993 to 2007 for Spain and 
Germany. In all figures, tables and formulae E stands for Spain and Ger for 
Germany. Our analysis is implemented both at aggregate level as well as for 
individual branches of manufacturing industry. Here again, the dataset used here 
consists of 23 goods-producing industries that correspond to the 2-digit ISIC 
Revision 3.0. For a list of industries see table 2.A.1. 
 
Our output measure is gross value added at basic prices 1995=100, labour 
productivity is defined in terms of hours worked as well as all the variables needed 
for the analysis, where appropriate. All monetary variables are expressed in Euros 
1995 =100.  
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3.3. Decomposition of aggregate Productivity Changes in Rate and in 
Level Effect 
Here we implement the same methodology used by Fernández Casillas and Maté 
Rubio (1994) in their decomposition of aggregate productivity change analysis, but 
for the Spanish and German manufacturing. Aggregate average productivity is 
affected over time by changes in productivity within sectors and movements in 
output and employment or hours worked across sectors with different levels of 
average productivity. We analyse to what extent the existing gap in aggregate 
productivity in manufacturing industry between Spain and Germany is explained by 
changes in the sectoral structure (level effect), by productivity changes within sectors 
(rate effect) and by a small interaction effect (residual) consequence of the other two 
changes. 
 
This methodology (Fernández Casillas and Maté Rubio, 1994) is interesting because 
it allows not only to study the aggregate productivity changes inside an industry, but 
its main advantage is that it permits to compute and compare directly two industries. 
This will show us some useful evidences for our analysis, which may be conclusive. 
To carry out this study we take the same data as those in the former sections (see 
Chapter 2.2). The results are examined for total manufacturing as well as for the 
different manufacturing branches. We depart from the following expression (3.1) 
where the aggregate productivity (LP or ?) growth can be decomposed in the rate 
effect (?), the second is the level effect (?) and the last term is the interaction effect 
(?). 
 
 ??? ? ???? ????? ????? (3.1) 
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Substituting all three effects in expression (3.1) we obtain the following expression. 
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Before turning to the discussion of the results it is convenient to point out two 
aspects. Firstly, the amount of the different effects is influenced by the degree of 
manufactures’ disaggregation and, secondly, for any degree of disaggregation we 
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depart from computing the average productivities of subsectors that may be very 
different among them. 
 
The empirical results are displayed in table 3.1. At a first glance, the figures in panel 
(a) and (b) confirm that the rate effect6 is the main determinant of aggregate 
productivity differences in both manufactures in the whole period as well as in all 
the subperiods. As far as productivity is an indicator of efficiency of how inputs are 
allocated and combined in order to obtain an output, the results are indicative for 
the relevance of this effect as main driver of aggregate productivity and of economic 
growth. Here again we can appreciate the poor performance of Spanish 
manufacturing when it comes to be efficient and to generate value added. 
Comparing the results of the level effect7 in the first and in the last subperiod, we 
observe how it experienced a slightly increase (from -0.1 to 0.8) in its importance in 
Spain (table 3.1) whereas the opposite happens in Germany (from 0.5 to -0.2). This 
is indicative of a small change in the production structure, confirming the results 
obtained in the previous section. Interaction effect (residual) is so small that is 
worthless to comment, being null its impact on productivity growth. Again we see 
that the subperiod 1999-2002 is one of slow progress of the three determinants and 
for thus also for productivity growth. Taking a look at panel (c) data confirm that 
the differences in aggregate productivity growth are mainly due to rate effect, rather 
than to level effect. So, we can conclude that the differences in manufactures’ 
specialization do not justify the existing gap in productivity among both 
manufacturing. 
 
In order to complete our analysis, in the next section 3.4, we will apply the second 
methodology to decompose aggregate productivity differences into the following 
three components: structural change, specialization or industry mix, productivity differentials 
and allocative. The objective is to confirm our hypothesis that changes in 
manufactures’ specialization do not justify productivity differences between Spanish 
and German manufacturing industries. This time instead of computing growth rates 
(dynamic analysis), we will implement the present analysis taking the variables in 
level (static analysis). We aim to complement the dynamic point of view with the 
static one, in order to get a more complete view of our study. 
  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6 The rate effect is the part of aggregate productivity that results from changes in average labour 
productivity within sectors. It is the amount of aggregate change that would have occurred if each 
sector‘s share of total hours worked by engaged person remained constant. 
7 The level effect, also called intersectoral composition effect, is the part of the variation in aggregate 
productivity explained by the change in the structure of total hours worked by engaged person, 
plainly employment. Put in another way, it reflects the change in aggregate productivity due to 
variations in employment in manufacturing industry, remaining sectoral productivities constant.
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Table43.1. Decomposition of aggregate productivity change. Manufacturing 
industry: Spain and Germany, 1993-2007 
Average annual growth rates in % 
1993-2007 1993-1998 1999-2002 2003-2007
(a) Spain 
Rate effect    ? Et  (a) 22.2 7.8 1.9 7.1
Level effect  ?Et  (b) 1.4 -0.1 0.9 0.8
Interaction effect   ?Et  (c) 1.0 0.4 0.1 -0.3
? Productivity/ Productivity  ?Et  = (a) + (b) + (c) 24.6 8.1 2.8 7.7
(b) Germany 
Rate effect   ?Gert  (a) 61.9 17.7 8.5 19.7
Level effect  ?Gert  (b) 1.2 0.5 0.2 -0.2
Interaction  effect   ?Gert  (c) -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.1
? Productivity/ Productivity  ?Gert  = (a) + (b) + (c) 62.2 18.1 8.6 19.4
(c) Ratio Spain/Germany 
Rate effect(?Et- ?Gert)   (a) 35.8 44.2 21.9 36.3
Level effect     (?Et - ?Gert)   (b) 116.8 -20.4 501.1 -460.3
Interaction effect  (?Et- ?Gert)   (c) -123.6 -985.0 -201.9 220.8
      ? Productivity/ Productivity  (?Et-?Gert) = (a) + (b) + (c)    39.5 44.7 32.5 39.5
 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations. 
 
3.4. Decomposition of aggregate productivity changes in three 
components: Structural change, productivity differential and 
allocative 
As we have seen from different perspectives (chapter 2.4 and chapter 3.3), the 
industrial dimension seems to play an important role in labour productivity 
performance. Here we want to enforce the conclusions driven from the latter 
decomposition of aggregate productivity changes in three components following the 
methodology applied by Esteban (1972, 1994 and 2000).  
 
In 1972 Esteban modified the standard decomposition into two factors extending it 
to the sum of three components: structural change or industry mix, productivity differential 
and allocative. The first part reports on the percentage of growth attributable to the 
industry mix in each region. The second measures the part due to the fastest growth 
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of the region at the sectoral level (possibly caused by increased productivity). Finally, 
the third component measures the covariance between the first two components. 
This can be interpreted as the contribution to regional growth resulting from their 
specialization in those activities in which the region is more competitive. His model 
has been widely accepted as there have been many researchers who still have used it 
with modifications (Herzog and Olsen, 1977; Tervo and Okko, 1983, Ledebur and 
Moomaw, 1983; Arcelus, 1984). 
 
Although this kind of analysis, known as shift-share analysis, was originally 
conceived as a technique to analyze regional employment dynamics, its extension is 
immediate to decomposition of interregional differentials aggregate productivity. 
Here we will apply this methodology with the aim to decompose the difference in 
the level of average labour productivity between Spain and Germany. Since in this 
paper the comparison is between two manufacturing industries - Spain and 
Germany - manufacturing industries instead of regions will be discussed. When 
computing differences between both manufactures, again we take Germany as a 
benchmark. At this point it is important to advice in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings that we will use the term industry mix referred specifically to 
manufacturing industry, not to the whole industry. 
 
The objective is to examine whether the slower productivity growth is due to a 
lesser redistribution of factors towards branches with higher productivity levels 
and/or higher productivity growth (structural change or industry mix effect), or if it is a 
consequence of an overall slower growth of productivity at manufacturing industry 
level (productivity differentials). The following expression reflects the gap between 
average productivity between country i and the reference or benchmark country 
decomposed into three components. Each of these components of the aggregate 
includes a source causing productivity differences (Esteban; 1972, 1994 and 2000). 
 
 ???? ??? ? ? ??? ???? ?? ??? (3.3) 
 
In order to determine the relevance of specific productivity differentials and/or industry 
mix in manufacturing, we contrast each manufacturing branch against a benchmark, 
one endowed with sectoral productivities and industry mix equal to a manufacturing 
industry average. Thus, the peculiarities of the Spanish manufacturing branches will 
be captured by the differences between the Spanish and the benchmark industry 
mix and between the Spanish and the benchmark sectoral productivities. To this 
end, we simulate for Spain the aggregate productivity that it would have had, if it 
deferred from the benchmark standards in one respect only. The difference with 
respect to the benchmark German productivity gives the contribution of each of 
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these components in explaining the gap between Spanish actual and benchmark 
German aggregate productivity. 
 
Table 3.2 shows results for a few key years over time, as well as the average for the 
whole period. Firstly, in panel (a) we see the differences between both manufactures 
and, secondly, in (b) we have computed these differences as a percentage of labour 
productivity in the manufacturing industry of reference. Let us start by looking at 
panel (a), all three effects display a growing trend in the differences between both 
industries in the whole period, showing a significant increase between the 2003 and 
2007.  
 
Table53.2. Shift-share analysis. Spain - Germany, 1993-2007 
?
(a) Shift-share components 
In percentage 
1993 1999 2003 2007 Average 
Industry mix(a):  ?Ei=  ?i (pEit - pGerit) * xGerit -1.4 -2.0 -2.3 -4.0 -2.1 
Productivity differential(b):  ?Ei =  ?i (xEit - xGerit) * pGerit -8.8 -11.8 -14.9 -20.4 -13.0 
Allocative(c):  ?Ei =  ?i (pEit - pGerit) * (xEit - xGerit) 0.7 0.5 0.7 2.5 0.7 
Average productivity difference  (xEit - xGerit)  
=  ?i + ?i + ?i -9.6 -13.4 -16.5 -22.0 -14.9 
 
(b) Weight of each component ?iE, ?iE y ?iE on the productivity differential   
In percentage 
1993 1999 2003 2007 Average 
Industry mix:  ?Ei =  ?i (pEit - pGerit) * xGerit 15.1 14.9 13.9 18.3 14.7 
Productivity differential:  ?Ei =  ?i (xEit - xGerit) * pGerit 91.9 88.5 90.1 93.0 90.0 
Allocative:  ?Ei =  ?i (pEit - pGerit) * (xEit - xGerit) -7.0 -3.5 -4.0 -11.3 -4.8 
Average productivity difference  (xEit - xGerit)  
= ?i + ?i + ?i 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Notes: (a) ?i is the so-called industry mix, specialization or structural change effect of country i and measures 
the productivity differential between two countries due to the production structure of their 
industries, under the hypothesis that sectoral productivities are the same as in the reference country. 
(b) ?i is the productivity differential, country or within-industry effect and shows the growth of labour 
productivity that would have occurred even without any structural change or difference in the 
industrial specialization. 
(c) ?i is called allocation, interaction or dynamic effect and is positive if the industry is specialized with 
respect to the mean of the reference country/industry in sectors where productivity is higher than 
that of the benchmark industry, and negative if below. 
 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations 
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Productivity differentials component is the main explaining factor of aggregate 
productivity differences; Spain seems not to be able to reverse this trend of 
increasing differences, even in the expansive stage of the economic cycle. 
Concerning the structural change or industry mix it is also negative but significantly 
smaller, although the gap is increasing in time and gaining importance in explaining 
the performance of aggregate productivity differences. The allocative component ?i 
shows a similar behaviour as the other two effects, but their figures are considerably 
smaller. Hence as they do have an almost null influence explain the differences in 
productivity changes, we ignore them. 
 
In figure 3.1 the performance for all the years is displayed, confirming our 
interpretation of the results. The overall image is that Spain is lagging behind 
Germany, showing a poor performance of the productivity differentials component and 
to a lesser degree lacking ability to change its productive structure or industry mix 
component in a faster rhythm. Differences in labour productivity are cross-sectional 
as well as within sectors, indicating that it is not an isolated problem of few 
branches, but of the whole manufacturing. As said already before in chapter 2, the 
increasing investment in capital stock and, particularly in ICT capital, which in this 
period showed up as main drivers of GDP growth together with the increasing 
employment rate indicate that labour productivity differences cannot be mainly 
attributed to factors’ accumulation (Corrado et al., 2014; Corrado et al., 2012; Mas et 
al., 2012). In the considered period the increased employment rate is characterized 
by being made up mainly of low skilled workers (Mas et al., 2012). In order to 
assimilate and to take advantage of the new technologies and knowledge embedded 
in new capital stock, it is relevant that human capital attains a certain level of 
absorptive capacity (European Competitiveness Report, 2013). If we consider that it 
is not the case in Spain’s manufacturing, this might explain the lower ability to 
generate value added and thus to improve labour productivity growth. In every 
branch Spain’s manufacturing is specialized in the production of a variety of goods 
both with less technological content and quality in contrast to Germany, which give 
rise to an adverse quality gap (Lladós-Masllorens and Fernández-Sirera, 2004). The 
process of differentiated vertical unfavourable specialization together with the fact 
that Spanish manufacturing is still mainly specialized in low to medium technology 
intense branches might explain to some extent the persistent differences in labour 
productivity between Spain and Germany. Consequently, all this has a negative 
impact on Spain’s competitiveness in the international markets in contrast to 
Germany. Although this is the most immediate conclusion of both decomposition 
methodologies implemented here, the results suggest that manufacturing industry 
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specialization (structural change or industry mix component) in Spain is changing, but its 
rhythm or speed of change is maybe too slow lagging behind Germany.  
 
Figure73.1. Weight of each component ?iE, ?iE and ?iE on the productivity 
differential (in %). Spain and Germany, 1993-2007 
 
Source: EU KLEMS (2009), www.euklems.net and own calculations. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have analyzed the sources in productivity differences between the 
Spanish and German manufacturing industry in the period 1993-2007. The 
countries chosen for this study are representative of the existent polarization in 
European manufacturing, that of a “periphery” and of a “centre”. Where the 
“periphery” is composed of the so-called weak countries whose manufactures are 
displaying difficulties in their productivity performance and thus in their 
competitiveness and economic growth. On the contrary, the countries belonging to 
the “centre” have a large and strong manufacturing base. 
 
Despite all the efforts and advances undertaken in the context of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), there are still existing significant disparities in 
manufacturing performance in the EU preventing from being homogenous in this 
regard. Presently, the EU is characterized, on the one hand, by a group of member 
states like Germany with strong manufacturing bases maintaining a robust position 
on global markets, whose model is clearly export-oriented and, on the other hand, 
by another group displaying relatively high commercial deficits (France, Spain, 
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Portugal, Greece, Italy) and with less diversified manufacturing industrial sectors 
(Dhéret, 2014). 
 
Major drivers of competitiveness, be it productivity level, capacity to export, or the 
structure and diversity of the manufacturing base, have evolved in different ways 
across the territory. For instance, comparing levels of labour productivity across 
Europe confirms the presence of huge differences between EU countries. 
 
To this end and in order to define and to design the base for industrial policy 
measures focused on manufactures, we posed several questions in order to single 
out the factors that may determine this gap, taking Germany as the benchmark 
country, representative for the “centre” and Spain, for the “periphery”.  
 
Differences in sectoral specialization could explain differences in productivity, and, 
in fact, our results have shown that Spain’s manufacturing industry is characterized 
as a traditional one where low and medium technology branches generate the 
greatest part of value added, while in Germany the bulk is on the high and medium 
technology branches, but the situation is changing although very slowly. In addition, 
if we take into account that the creation of employment in the considered period is 
characterized mainly by low skilled workers, this would explain the poor labour 
productivity performance resulting in the production of low quality goods in 
comparison to Germany. These differences in the goods’ quality, the so-called quality 
gap (Lladós-Masllorens and Fernández-Sirera, 2004) as a result of an unfavourable 
manufacturing specialization might shed some light on the causes hindering Spain’s 
a from a better performance of economic growth and competitiveness in the 
international markets. So, this is indicative that it is not a matter of factors’ 
accumulation (Mas et al., 2012).  
 
The results obtained may shed some light on why Spanish economy is showing up 
difficulties for recovering from the present crisis. But they also show up the need to 
identify and to design policy measures or initiatives to overcome the difficulties the 
Spanish manufacturing industry has in order to improve its productivity and to 
support manufacturing-based industrial competitiveness. These measures could be 
both horizontal as well as specific addressed to concrete manufacturing sectors, 
depending on their difficulties. Industrial policy measures focused on manufactures 
coordinated with other measures concerning human capital, information and 
communication technologies, as well as improving the competitiveness should aim 
to reduce the gap between the “periphery”, Spain, and the “centre”, Germany.  
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So, a different policy perspective is needed, addressing not only at the European 
level but at the national and regional level to end the depression and rebuild 
sustainable economic activities in a less polarized continent. Decisions on the future 
of the manufacturing industrial structure in Europe have to be brought back into 
the public domain. 
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Chapter 4: Intangible assets and labour 
productivity growth 
4.1. Introduction 
As explained in chapter 1, since 1995 the rate of labour productivity growth in 
Europe has been declining almost in the whole considered period, with the 
exception of two short positive time spans coinciding with the upswing of the 
business cycle at the end of the 1990s and around 2006–2007. Finally, during the 
Great Recession in 2008-09, the European Union (EU) saw a decline in labour 
productivity parallel to the contraction of the economy.  
 
As a consequence, many authors have tried to find explanations to the declining 
trend of labour productivity growth over the last two decades. (Corrado et al., 2005, 
2006, 2009; Marrano and Haskel, 2006; Van Rooijen-Horsten et al., 2008; Fukao et 
al., 2009; Hao et al., 2009; Marrano et al., 2009, Mc Morrow et al., 2010; Edquist, 
2011; Strobel, 2012; Mas et al., 2012; Timmer et al., 2010; Timmer et al., 2011). They 
found evidence that increased investment in intangible assets explain a large share of 
the unexplained labour productivity growth and thus for economic growth. 
 
The nature of the impact of the inclusion of intangible capital in the growth 
accounting model is similar across the countries for which the estimates are 
available. It determines an increase in labour productivity growth and in the 
contribution of capital deepening, and a decrease in total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth. But intangible expenditure is currently treated as current expense in the 
national accounts rather than as an investment. This determines an understatement 
of investment in the economy and an incomplete picture of the main sources of 
growth. 
 
The aim of this chapter to explore the contribution to labour productivity growth of 
investment in different single intangible asset types in manufacturing industry for a 
set of 9 European member states between 1995 and 2010. The results should help 
us to identify which single or mix of intangible assets types are the main drivers of 
labour productivity growth in order to define and establish adequate industrial 
policy measures to promote a better economic performance. The purpose is not to 
demonstrate if investment in intangibles contributes to labour productivity growth, 
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as Muntean (2014), Roth and Thum (2013), Ilmakunnas and Piekkola (2014) and 
Corrado et al. (2014) among others have already shown. But we want to go a step 
further and identify which single intangible assets belonging to the different 
categories of intangibles are major drivers of it. This may help to define strategies to 
improve labour productivity performance for industry. We also analyze a longer 
time period (1995-2010) than other authors like Corrado et al. (2013), they examine 
the period 1995-2007, Strobel (2012), who examines the period 1992-2005 and Hao 
et al. (2009) just examine one year: 2004.  
 
In particular, in this chapter we use the estimates of intangible capital for the 
European countries produced by the INTAN-Invest database for the period 1995-
2010. Following Hao et al. (2009) as well as Corrado et al. (2005, 2006, 2009), we will 
consider that intangible assets can be classified into three groups which include 
computerised information, innovative property and economic competencies. We 
focus on manufacturing industry in contrast to many other studies (Dal Borgo et al., 
2013; Edquist, 2011; Hao et al., 2009) that examine the business or the market 
sector. The reasons to concentrate our research in manufacturing industry are 
related to the particular situation of the countries analysed.  
 
All this happens in a context where the increasing importance of intangible capital 
as a major driver of labour productivity growth (Muntean, 2014; Corrado et al., 2012; 
Dal Borgo et al. 2012; Equist, 2011), thus enhancing economic growth and 
competitiveness, is fully recognized. Until now, in chapter 2 and 3 we have seen that 
labour productivity differences are persistent, that to some extent differences in 
sectoral specialization could explain them and that they cannot be attributable 
mainly to factors’ accumulation. In the context of the knowledge economy and with 
the aim of going a step further against this background, it is interesting to investigate 
the role of intangible investment labour productivity.  
 
In contrast to chapter 2 and 3 where we have examined the performance of labour 
productivity growth focusing on two benchmark countries, Spain and Germany, 
each one representative for the so-called “periphery” and “centre” according to 
Dhéret (2014) and Pianta (2013), respectively, here we want to take a bigger sample. 
Thus we have extended it in order to provide a more complete and diverse view 
resulting from the different countries’ characteristics to the study. At the same time, 
we also overcome the reduced availability of more detailed information for Spain 
and Germany.  
 
In the last years investment has shifted from tangible to intangible capital, but 
depending on the countries the contribution of intangibles investment to labour 
productivity growth is larger or lower than of tangibles (Falk, 2013). So different 
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intangible investments’ strategies might lead to differentiated contributions to 
labour productivity growth which results in countries displaying a better 
performance than others. This fact would explain the generation of two groups of 
countries. 
 
For the sample of EU member states chosen here, we examined it was possible to 
group them. Figure 4.1 provides evidence for the differentiated behaviour of the set 
of 9 EU member states considered in the present study. Attending to the 
performance of standardised gross value added (GVA) average growth and labour 
productivity growth it is possible to classify the sample in two groups. The first one 
displays positive values for both variables and thus a better performance than the 
second one, with negative values. Due to the fact that until recently intangibles have 
been considered as an expense and not as an investment in the growth accounting 
framework, it is interesting to examine to what extent intangibles investment can 
provide an explanation for such a differentiated behaviour between countries. If 
affirmative, separating countries in different groups taking into account their 
specific characteristics and problems in manufacturing industry should permit to 
design concrete policy measure obtaining better results in terms of efficacy and 
efficiency.  
 
All this explains the resurgence and renewed interest in industrial policy and on how 
to design and implement targeted but also homogeneous (Dhéret, 2014; Pianta, 
2013; O’Sullivan et al., 2013).  
 
Taking all this into account, the research questions that we try to answer in this 
paper are the following:  
 
? Which of the different intangible assets better explain manufacturing labour 
productivity growth in the EU countries between 1995 and 2010? 
? Are there heterogeneous effects of investment in intangible assets on labour 
productivity growth in the different considered EU countries? 
? Which are the implications in terms of industrial policy? 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 briefly summarizes some 
of the literature background on intangibles and productivity growth. Section 4.3 
presents a description of the data and the empirical evidence. Section 4.4 concludes 
indicating the main policy implications and the next steps in our research. 
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Figure84.1. Standardised GVA average growth (vertical axis) and labour 
productivity growth (horizontal axis) in manufacturing industry, 1995-2010 
?
?
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on EUKLEMS (2012 release) www.euklems.net and Eurostat 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/database 
 
  
IT
ES
FRBE
DE
NL
AT
FI
SE
?2.0
?1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
?3.0 ?2.0 ?1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Chapter 4 
?
55 
 
4.2. Background literature 
There is an extensive literature on intangible investment, addressing issues as its 
measurement, the convenience to capitalize and to include them in the national 
accounting system as well as their contribution to labour productivity growth 
(Corrado et al., 2005; Marrano et al., 2009; Chun et al., 2012; Goodridge et al., 2013; 
Baldwin et al., 2012; Miyagawa and Hisa, 2013).  
 
Results of Van Ark’s et al. (2009) study analyzing the reasons for the slow labour 
productivity growth in EU member states suggest that it might be explained by the 
differences in the accumulation on intangible assets which play a complementary 
role to information and communication technologies (ICT) capital. Intangible assets 
have been largely ignored in national accounts due to the difficulty for measuring it.  
 
Research on this issue undertaken by Corrado et al. (2005, 2006; 2009) marks the 
beginning of a number of studies measuring intangible investment and showing the 
relevance of intangible capital for labour productivity growth. Departing from 
Nakamura’s (1999, 2001) analysis, they developed expenditure-based measures of a 
large range on intangible for the United States (US). The contribution of labour 
composition and physical, or tangible, capital deepening to labour productivity has 
been well researched. In contrast, until recently, intangible assets were not 
considered as contributors to labour productivity growth. Similar studies have been 
conducted in Canada, (Muntean, 2014), Japan (Fukao et al., 2009), Australia (Barnes 
and McClure, 2009) and Europe (Corrado et al., 2013; Goodridge et al., 2013; Roth 
and Thum, 2013; Jona-Lasinio et al., 2011; Jalava et al., 2007).  
 
Until recently, spending on intangible assets was counted as an intermediate expense 
in the systems of national accounts rather than as investment in intangible capital. 
Corrado et al. (2009) indicate that specific features of some intangible assets, such as 
nonrivalness and the lack of verifiability, visibility and appropriability of returns 
explain the fact that the majority of intangible assets are disqualified as capital. 
These authors, however, argue that these distinct features do not make intangible 
assets an intermediate good. (Muntean, 2014, p.23) 
 
Corrado et al. (2006) argue that the reason for treating intangibles as capital is that 
any use of resources that reduces current consumption in order to increase it in the 
future can be considered as an investment. It is not so long since computer software 
is now treated as capital in the national accounts of many countries, whereas many 
other intangibles, as for example research and development (R&D), are currently 
not. Intangible assets are generally defined as assets that provide future benefits but 
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do not have a physical embodiment, such as software, research and development 
R&D, market and consumer research. 
 
Despite their uniqueness, intangible assets share basic common characteristics of 
physical capital. As any other type of capital, intangibles are used in production of 
goods and services and provide future benefits. As investment in physical capital, 
investment in intangible assets represents foregone current consumption for the 
benefit of greater future consumption. 
 
Thus, intangible assets should be classified as capital and spending on intangibles 
should be counted as investment rather than operational or intermediate expenses. 
Otherwise, the aggregate level of output would remain underestimated. This 
potentially creates distortions in business investment and resource allocation. In 
addition, effectiveness of public policy may also be adversely affected if investment 
and capital in the economy are measured imprecisely. These distortions could 
ultimately lead to a decline in productivity and economic growth. 
 
At present, the major challenge is to measure investment and intangible assets’ 
stocks as well as its contribution to labour productivity growth (Muntean, 2014). As 
Jona-Lasinio et al. (2011) state, there is a large number of studies on intangible 
investment and its appropriate measurement and contribution to labour productivity 
growth. The problem is that most of them focus only on some assets (R&D capital, 
for example) leaving outside other elements such as organizational capital or brand 
equity. But some authors, as Sichel (2008),  went a step further in implementing new 
approaches to measuring intangibles as financial market valuation, direct 
expenditure data and other performance measures. 
 
Taking into account a possible revision of the national accounting framework, 
Corrado et al. (2005) proposed a broader definition for innovation in order to 
examine its impact on labour productivity growth. For this purpose, they have 
grouped the various items that constitute the knowledge of the firm into three basic 
categories: i) computerised information, ii) innovative property and iii) economic 
competencies.  
 
Computerized information includes knowledge which is embedded in computer 
programs and computerised databases. Innovative property includes the scientific 
knowledge embedded in patents, licenses, and general know-how, as well as “the 
innovative and artistic content in commercial copyrights, licences and designs” 
(Corrado et al., 2005, pp. 23–26).  
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The economic competencies category is defined as “the value of brand names and 
other knowledge embedded in firm-specific human and structural resources” 
(Corrado et al., 2005, p.28). It includes expenditures on advertising, market research, 
firm-specific human capital, and organizational capital. These measures try to 
capture a range of knowledge assets that firms invest to run their business, which 
are key to encourage labour productivity growth. Examples of those are an increase 
in the selling potential of a product, the development of processes and a productive 
environment for the actual physical production of a good.  
 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) showed the positive relationship between computerized 
information, here in particular via an interaction effect with organizational capital, 
on labour productivity growth. Other authors as Lichtenberg (1993), Coe and 
Helpman, (1995), Park, (1995) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 
(2001) did the same with certain dimensions of innovative property (scientific 
R&D), demonstrating its contribution to labour productivity growth. 
 
The single dimensions of economic competencies, namely brand names, firm-
specific human capital, and organizational capital are also relevant in stimulating 
labour productivity growth. 
 
Following Roth and Thum (2013) Brand names should positively affect labour 
productivity growth since an important aspect of today’s products is the “image” 
attached to them. The ownership of a brand that is appealing to customers permits a 
seller to acquire a higher margin for goods or services that are like those offered by 
competitors. Expenditure on market research compromises, next to expenditure on 
advertising, an important part of the investment in brand equity (Cañibano et al., 
2000). 
 
Another important asset of a firm is Firm-specific human capital. Cañibano et al. (2000) 
stress that a firm with more competent employees is likely to acquire higher profits 
than competitors whose workers are less skilled. In this regard, Abowd et al. (2005) 
argue that the value of companies will increase if the quality of their human 
resources increases. 
 
Organizational capital of a firm is another relevant dimension of economic 
competencies. In an era where goods become more and more sophisticated and 
production processes are becoming more complex, the management of the 
production process that involve highly technological physical capital is key factor for 
firm. Organizational capital is defined by Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005, p. 75) as 
“an agglomeration of technologies-business practices, processes and designs and 
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incentive and compensation systems—that together enable some firms to 
consistently and efficiently extract from a given level of physical and human 
resources a higher value of product tan other firms find possible to attain.” They 
(Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2003, 2005) considered it the only competitive asset truly 
owned by a firm, while the others are tradable and thus available for every firm that 
wants to invest in them. 
 
The recent empirical evidence shows that intangible capital contributes significantly 
to labour productivity growth, which is ultimately reflected in economic growth. 
There is a vast amount of literature showing and examining it for the different types 
of intangibles and from different points of view. Belhocine (2009) finds that in 
Canada, if spending on intangible assets is not included in aggregate investment, real 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth is on average underestimated by 0.1 
percentage point per year from 1999 to 2001. It is underestimated by about 0.25 
percentage point for 2004 (Muntean, 2014, p. 23). 
 
Corrado et al. (2009) indicate that in the US, if investment in intangibles is not 
included, GDP growth is underestimated by about 0.25 percentage point per year 
from 1995 to 2002. Further studies on the contribution of intangibles to labour 
productivity growth like the one undertaken by Van Ark et al. (2009) focusing on the 
market sector in the US and selected European countries for the 1995-2006 show 
that intangible capital deepening contributed on average 0.83 percentage point in the 
US and 0.72 percentage point in the larger European countries (Muntean, 2014, p. 
23). Dal Borgo et al. (2013) showed that for the period 2000 to 2008 intangible 
capital deepening accounted for a 23% of growth in market sector value added in 
United Kingdom (UK), a larger contribution than computer hardware (12%). 
 
Ilmakunnas and Piekkola (2013) demonstrate that investment in organizational 
capital influences positively labour productivity growth. The results obtained by 
Yallwe and Buscemi (2014) who discuss the contributions of intellectual assets to 
labour productivity growth are also positive. 
 
Recent data obtained by Corrado et al. (2013, p. 278) show that the rate of tangible 
investment in the EU15 declined sharply from 2007 to 2009, while the rate of 
intangible investment remained about flat. In the US, intangible investment fell. 
Across Europe there are small differences by regions, and intangible investment 
relative to tangibles held up better in recent years on both continents. All told, the 
shift to intangible investment from 1995 to 2009 is a striking trend.  
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In this context, there are still many issues that have not been tackled yet in the 
literature8. The present paper contributes to advances in this topic by considering 
how the single categories of intangible investment influence labour productivity 
growth in the manufacturing industry and which combinations are more appropriate 
than others. To our knowledge, such kind of analysis has not been implemented nor 
for the manufacturing industry using data covering the Great Recession.  
4.3. Data and empirical evidence 
4.3.1. Data 
To carry out this study we use the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, 
July 2012 release (henceforth EUKLEMS)9 which contain internationally 
comparable data for output and inputs. This database includes a wide range of 
measures on output growth, employment, skill creation, capital formation and multi-
factor productivity at the industrial level for EU member states from 1970 until 
2010. Concretely, the EU KLEMS data used in this paper are: value added, value 
added deflator, number of employed workers and number of hours worked by 
employed. 
 
Our output measure is gross value added at basic prices 2005=100, labour 
productivity is defined in terms of hours worked as well as all the variables needed 
for the analysis, where appropriate. Total hours worked by persons engaged are 
expressed in millions of hours. These variables All monetary variables are expressed 
in Euros 2005 =100.  
 
As Timmer et al. (2007a and 2007b) state, the main advantage of EU KLEMS (from 
now on EUKLEMS) database is that it allows going beyond the aggregate level of 
economy to analyze the productivity performance of individual industries and their 
contribution to aggregate growth.  
 
Here we take from EUKLEMS database Gross value added at basic prices and Total 
hours worked by persons engaged are expressed in millions of hours. Labour productivity 
is defined in terms of hours worked as well as all the variables needed for the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8 For instance, Roth and Thum (2011) propose to consider a wider dimension of intangible capital 
in the national accounting framework in order to achieve a more accurate assessment of the labour 
productivity growth performance and thus of economic growth. Jona-Lasinio et al. (2011) also 
identifies the need to analyse to what extent investment in intangibles influences labour 
productivity growth on the long run as the time span considered by most studies is quite short. 
9 For a detailed description of the data, see Timmer et al. (2007 a, b) and http://www.euklems.net. 
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analysis, where appropriate. All monetary variables are expressed in millions of 
Euros 2005 =100.  
 
Data on investment in intangibles stems from the database INTAN-INVEST10. For 
more information on the source and details for measurement of intangible assets see 
Corrado et al. (2014a and 2014b). Corrado et al. (2006) distinguish three classes of 
intangible assets: 
(i) Computerized information: software and databases11; 
(ii) Innovative property: (scientific & non-scientific) R&D, design 
(including architectural and engineering design), product development 
in the financial industry, exploration of minerals and production of 
artistic originals. 
(iii) Economic competencies: firm investment in reputation, human and 
organizational capital. 
 
Concerning investment in intangibles we include all the variables belonging to these 
three classes of assets for which data are available for the considered period12.  
 
Data on Gross fixed capital formation (investment in tangible assets) are obtained 
from Eurostat.13 
 
The data used in this paper covers the period from 1995 to 2010 for a set of nine 
EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden). The reasons to analyze these countries are related to data 
availability on intangible assets. However, an adequate geographical coverage of the 
EU15 is provided as they cover both members of the core and the periphery that, as 
have highlighted before, is relevant for the analysis of manufacturing productivity 
growth during the considered period. 
 
Table 4.1 displays the list of variables considered in the present analysis while more 
detailed information of variable definition and sources are provided in Appendix 
4.A.1. Appendix 4.A.2 also provides some descriptive statistics of the dataset used. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10 http://www.INTAN-Invest.net 
11 Concerning Computerised information, its major component is software, the other component is 
databases and covers expenses of software developed for a firm’s own use. It includes mainly three 
components: own use, purchased, and custom software (Corrado et al., 2005). According to 
Corrado et al. (2014b) as far as only data of software are available in INTAN-Invest database, we 
take this variable as representative one for computerised information. 
12 For more details see the source documentation Corrado et al. (2014b). 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/database 
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4.3.2. Empirical evidence 
In order to estimate the contribution of investment of intangible assets to labour 
productivity, a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function has been used as the 
starting point. As in Roth and Thum (2013), a reduced form equation in which the 
independent variable is the growth rate of investment in intangible asset and the 
dependent variable is labour productivity growth can be easily derived from this 
theoretical model. The analysis is undertaken in growth rates, thus all variables are 
expressed in terms of logarithmic differences.  
 
In particular, the change in the log of labour productivity of manufacturing in 
country i between time t and t-1 (LPit-LPit-1) is explained by the change of the 
different of intangible assets between time t and t-1,(Xt-Xt-1). The model is enlarged 
with country fixed effects (Ci) that will account for potential unobserved 
heterogeneity and also with period effects (Yt) accounting for common shocks in 
the considered countries, while Uit is a random error term. 
 
 ???? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ????? ? ????? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??? (4.1) 
 
The number of countries considered is 9 and the time period analyzed involves 15, 
so it is balanced panel with 135 observations.  
 
The analysis is implemented in two steps. Firstly, we start the analysis by introducing 
one by one the single intangible assets types belonging to each of the above defined 
classes of intangible assets in order to find out if they are significant or not and if, 
affirmative to what extent they are contributors to labour productivity growth. 
Secondly, we combine the significant independent variables and introduce in the 
equation in order to find out how well or not they work together in increasing 
labour productivity.  
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Table64.1. Variable description 
Notes: 
1. All monetary variables are expressed in constant prices (2005 = 100) per Total hours 
worked by persons engaged. 
2. INN_PROP = R&D + ARCH_DES_NFP_MIN_ART 
3. ECON_COMP = ADV_MKT + TRAIN + ORGCAP 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Corrado, Carol, Jonathan Haskel, Cecilia Jona-Lasinio and Massimiliano 
Iommi (2014). "Internationally comparable macro-estimates of investment in intangible assets at 
the industry level: INTAN - Invest" available at www.INTAN-Invest.net. 
 
  
Variable description Acronym (1) 
Gross value added  VA 
Total hours worked by persons engaged H_EMP 
Gross value added, price indices VA_P 
Labour productivity LP 
Total investment. Gross Fixed Capital Formation GFCF 
Investment in tangible assets. Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation TC 
Investment in intangible assets. Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation IC 
Computer software SW 
Innovative Property (2) INN_PROP 
Economic Competencies (3) ECON_COMP 
Scientific R&D R&D 
New architectural and engineering designs, New 
product development costs in the financial industry 
Entertainment, Artistic and Literary Originals and 
Mineral Explorations 
ARCH_DES_NFP_MIN_
ART 
Market research and Advertising expenditure ADV_MKT 
Training TRAIN 
Organizational Capital ORGCAP 
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Table 4.2 reports the estimation results for all countries between 1995 and 2010. 
The analysis starts by estimating the contribution of both investment in intangible 
and tangible assets to labour productivity growth. According to other studies Hao et 
al. (2009), Roth and Thum (2013) and Corrado et al. (2014a) here too intangible 
assets contribute significantly to labour productivity growth in contrast to tangible 
capital which turned out not to be significant in our model (table 4.2, column 1). 
Concretely in the 1995-2010 period, intangibles contributed on 0.16 percentage 
point (table 4.2, column 2) with and adjusted R-square value of 0.60.  
 
The first step is to introduce each single intangible asset type in the estimation 
equation. When introducing one by one the variables in order to identify those 
intangible assets that are significant for labour productivity growth, we find out that 
all an unexpected result, which is that investment in software has no influence on 
labour productivity labour growth (table 4.2, column 3). All the other assets 
included in the analysis have a positive influence on labour productivity growth. 
One possible explanation maybe that a minimum level of investment in software 
has been already achieved, so that additional investment is no significant. Perhaps it 
is the same that happened with the digital technologies, what matters is the use, not 
the endowment. Once everyone is provided with the software, now the difference 
lies strictly in its strategic use. When combining it with investment in organizational 
capital it turned out not be have any impact on labour productivity growth on 
contrary to the results obtained by Brynjolfsson et al. (2002).  
 
In this context, another unexpected result is the reduced influence of the single 
intangible components belonging to the category innovative property. Investment in 
scientific R&D (from now on R&D) is significant, but on the contrary to what one 
would have expected, shows little influence in promoting labour productivity 
growth (table 4.2, column 4: 0.10 percentage points and is statistically significant at a 
5% level, not at 1%). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the other asset type, 
architectural and engineering design, product development in the financial industry, exploration of 
minerals and production of artistic originals, its contribution to labour productivity growth 
is somewhat higher (table 4.2, column 5: 0.13 percentage point) than R&D. These 
two asset types when considered jointly as in column 9 (table 4.2) reveal themselves 
again as moderate contributors to labour productivity growth in contrast to economic 
competencies. 
 
Turning now to the third category of intangible assets, economic competences, and the 
variables included in it, the most relevant variable is vocational training (table 4.2, 
column 7). Among all the other variables considered in this paper vocational training 
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contributes the most to labour productivity growth (0.30 percentage points). It is by 
far the most significant variable among all the other considered in this study jointly 
with advertising and marketing (table 4.2, column 6), whose impact is of an annual 
growth rate of 0.17 percentage points on the dependent variable. The other 
intangible asset considered in this group is organizational capital (table 4.2, column 8), 
whose impact on labour productivity growth is similar to R&D, 0.11 percentage 
points. All three assets types are statistically significant at 1% level and display an 
adjusted R-square value between 0.60 and 0.62, which is an acceptable fit. These 
results provide a positive answer to our first research question on which intangible 
asset are significant for labour productivity growth. 
 
As Cañibano et al. (2000) demonstrated, the ownership of a brand that is attractive 
for the customers allows the sellers to obtain a higher margin for goods or services 
which are similar to those offered by the competitors. Thus the development of a 
brand becomes a key element in obtaining future benefits. Expenditure on market 
research and advertising constitutes an important part of the investment in brand 
equity (Roth and Thum, 2013). Presently, the management of the production 
process involves highly technological physical capital which requires high qualified 
workers. In such a context, the quality of the training of the workers becomes 
relevant. As far as goods become more elaborated and incorporate more high 
intensity technology, production processes are turning out more complex. Thus the 
training of the workers becomes crucial. As Cañibano et al. (2000) and Abowd et al. 
(2005) argue, a firm with better qualified workers is expected to obtain higher 
profits than other ones with less skilled employees. And also a firm with high 
qualified human resources will have a higher value than other companies with less 
qualified employees (Roth and Thum, 2013). 
 
The second step is to combine the different significant assets with other assets 
belonging to their category and afterwards with other belonging to the other 
intangible asset categories. When trying to assess the combined influence of more 
than one variable, we have to say that it only works when including two variables, 
not more, and only two equations are accepted, specifically columns 9 and 10 (table 
4.2). In both R&D is introduced in the model, once combined with architectural and 
engineering design, product development in the financial industry, exploration of minerals and 
production of artistic originals and the other one with advertising & marketing.  
 
Again this last variable shows up as an important driver, it contributes to an annual 
growth rate of 0.16 percentage points of labour productivity. In both equations 
R&D leads to an annual growth rate of 0.07 percentage points of the dependent 
variable, but is only at a statistically significant level of 10%, when all the other 
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variables are statistically significant at a 1% level. Adjusted R-square value is 
respectively, 0.61 and 0.62 percentage points, that is a good fitting. 
 
According to our data, real investment in intangible assets per hour worked grew at 
an average rate of 4.1 per cent from 1995 to 2010 (see Appendix 4.A.2). Software, 
although belonging to computerized information, one of the smallest categories of 
intangibles, was the fastest growing category in 1995-2010. It grew at an average 
annual rate of 8.7 per cent, followed by organizational capital with an average annual 
growth rate of 4.5 per cent. R&D as well as architectural and engineering design, product 
development in the financial industry, exploration of minerals and production of artistic originals 
grew at 4.2 percent, respectively. 
 
In terms of investment per hour worked for the sample of countries considered in 
this study these figures indicate that computerized information and innovative property 
represent the major part of investment in intangible assets. Thus, one may think that 
they are also major contributors to labour productivity growth in the 1995-2010 
period.  
 
But as we have seen before, estimations results do not provide support for it. On 
average, each of the asset types R&D as well as architectural and engineering design, 
product development in the financial industry, exploration of minerals and production of artistic 
originals belonging to innovative property contributed each one 0.07 and 0.12 percentage 
point (table 4.2, column 9) to labour productivity growth. In contrast, the 
components of economic competences are the ones which contribute most to labour 
productivity growth, particularly, vocational training (table 4.2, column 7: 0.30 
percentage points). Surprisingly, investment in vocational training shows lower growth 
rates. The same can be said for advertising & marketing the second major driver of 
labour productivity growth after vocational training, although the average investment 
rate is a bit higher. This raises the question on how to invest strategically in those 
intangible assets that are major contributors to labour productivity growth. In fact, 
higher investment rates in intangible assets do not necessarily imply that those assets 
become major drivers of labour productivity growth.  
 
Up to here we have answered the first research question; our results show that 
vocational training and advertising & marketing are the intangible assets that explain 
better labour productivity growth in manufacturing industry in the considered EU 
member states between 1995 and 2010. 
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The second research question aims to examine if there are there heterogeneous 
effects of investment in intangible assets in the different considered EU member 
states on labour productivity growth. As shown in the introduction, figure 4.1 
provides evidence for a differentiated behaviour between the set of 9 countries, 
both in terms of gross value added and labour productivity. This allows us to divide 
our sample in two groups, one with higher values of both average growth in gross 
value added and labour productivity - group 1 - and another one - group 2 – with 
lower values. The resulting groups of countries are: 
 
• Group 1: Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), Netherlands 
(NL) and Sweden (SE) 
• Group 2: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Italy (IT) and Spain (ES) 
 
Here again we reproduce the analysis undertaken in step 1 and 2. The aim is to 
analyze if different intangible investments’ strategies lead to a differentiated labour 
productivity growth and thus to a differentiated ability in generating gross value 
added. This would shed some light in explaining why some countries display a better 
performance labour productivity growth than others. We expect the latter allows us 
to discriminate when defining and implementing policy measures to improve the 
performance of labour productivity growth. It would permit to design concrete and 
targeted industrial policy measures, particularly, for the countries lagging behind the 
ones showing up a better performance. This will permit us to answer the third 
research question concerning the implications of a differentiated behaviour in terms 
of industrial policy. If affirmative, classifying the countries in different groups 
attending their specific characteristics and needs in manufacturing industry should 
permit to design concrete policy measure obtaining better results in terms of 
efficacy and efficiency.  
 
Considering the estimation results for group 1 (table 4.3), again here investment in 
intangibles reveals as a driver (table 4.3, column 2: 0.26 percentage points) of labour 
productivity growth in front of investment in tangible assets, which turns out not be 
significant (table 4.3, column 1). Considering the rest of variables individually, the 
results show that advertising & marketing (table 4.3, column 6: 0.24 percentage points), 
followed by organizational capital (table 4.3, column 8: 0.22 percentage points) and by 
architectural and engineering design, product development in the financial industry, exploration of 
minerals and production of artistic originals (table 4.3, column 5: 0.20 percentage points) 
are the ones which are significant at a level of 1% and are major contributors to 
labour productivity growth. Vocational training is significant too, but a level of 10% 
(table 4.3, column 7: 0.20 percentage points). All the other variables considered in 
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this study, either individually or combined with others, are rejected, because they are 
not significant. 
 
One possible explanation may be the specific characteristics of the manufacturing 
industry of the countries included in this group. For example, that in the considered 
period just investment in this kind of intangible assets are relevant and not others, 
maybe because the needs are different and they already have invested enough in the 
other assets types. Attending to the countries included in group 1, these are 
countries that have promoted or fostered more R&D (Van Ark et al., 2009). Again 
here the contribution of investment in software seems to be not relevant. 
 
Examining the estimation results for group 2 (table 4.4) they are similar to the ones 
obtained for all the countries in table 4.2, but the adjusted R-square values here are 
somewhat lower, that is between 0.33 and 0.51. Here too, tangible investment seems to 
have no influence on labour productivity growth. Increasing investment in vocational 
training (table 4.4, column 7: 0.45 percentage points) contributes most to labour 
productivity growth, followed by far by advertising & marketing (table 4.4, column 6). 
The same happens when considering this variable with other intangible assets as 
investment in R&D (table 4.4, column 11: 0.42 and 0.07 percentage points, 
respectively), architectural and engineering design, product development in the financial industry, 
exploration of minerals and production of artistic originals (table 4.4, column 12: 0.37 and 
0.10 percentage points, respectively) and advertising & marketing (table 4.4, column 
13: 0.38 and 0.12 percentage points, respectively). In contrast to group 1 here some 
combination of variables in an equation works out well together, but only when two 
variables are included, for more than two variables the equation is rejected. 
Following the same reasoning as in group 1, maybe here the countries considered 
need much more vocational training, and thus it is why this variable is so significant 
for labour productivity growth.  
 
The results obtained do provide an affirmative answer to the second research 
question, thus it is possible to identify heterogeneous effects of investment in 
intangibles on labour productivity growth. They also provide a positive evidence for 
classifying the sample of countries in two groups, although inside each group the 
countries display also a differentiated behaviour. But in any case, the proposed 
grouping seems reasonable to our purpose. 
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The findings support that differences in intangibles investment may explain 
the heterogeneity among the groups but also inside them. Group 1 is 
composed of member states that display a higher labour productivity growth 
and a greater ability in generating value added in front of group 2 which shows 
lower values (see figure 4.1). Inside each group intangible investments’ figures 
displays a differentiated behaviour too. For example, in group 2 there are 
countries like Belgium and France which are doing an effort in increasing 
intangibles investment but its labour productivity growth is still beyond the 
average in the considered period (see Appendix 4.A.2). Thus results reflect the 
different needs in terms of investment in intangibles aimed to promote labour 
productivity growth of the countries pertaining to this group. The same can be 
said for the countries belonging to group 1 although they are above the 
average. As a consequence, it is difficult to propose homogenous industrial 
policy measures for the countries belonging to each group aiming to improve 
their performance. This leads us to the third research question concerned 
about the implications of the obtained results in terms of industrial policy. For 
this reason different policy measures attaining to the differentiated needs in 
terms of intangible investment of the considered EU member states should be 
implemented. For sure common measures can be designed for each group of 
countries, but to obtain better positive results, they should be complemented 
with other specific measures focusing on the concrete problems of each 
member state.  
 
The main findings can be summarized as follows: all the considered intangible 
assets are significant for labour productivity growth with the only exception of 
software in both groups; and, specifically, R&D in group 1. Among the 
variables considered significant, vocational training and advertising & marketing are 
the ones which contribute individually most to labour productivity growth. As 
far as the image of the products is an important aspect, it is a reasonable result 
that advertising and marketing are an important driver of labour productivity 
growth.  
 
Concerning the splitting of the sample in order to identify such a differentiated 
behaviour in terms of labour productivity growth and intangibles’ investment 
between the groups, but homogeneous enough within them that allows 
proposing comprehensive policy measures for each group; results indicate that 
it is reasonable, but difficult. So they provide a positive answer to the second 
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research question. The implications of these findings for the design of 
industrial policy measures are that common measures should be combined 
with specific ones focusing on the particular needs in terms of intangibles 
investment of each country. A plausible explanation is provided by the 
heterogeneity of the characteristics of the different countries included in each 
group. Such diversity within each group needs concrete targeted solutions to 
problems shown up by each country to improve their labour productivity 
growth’s performance. Thus it is difficult to label the considered groups 
according to investment in intangibles or to a geographic criterion, for 
example, in order to design a single common industrial policy for the whole 
sample. 
4.4. Conclusions 
The present paper has explored the influence of different intangibles assets’ 
investment on labour productivity growth using international comparable 
panel data on manufacturing industry for 9 EU member states within a panel 
analysis between 1995 and 2010.  
 
Three findings have emerged according to the three posed research questions. 
First, empirical analysis reveals that all single intangible assets are significant 
contributors to labour productivity growth in these countries and period, 
except for software. A plausible explanation maybe that once a certain level of 
investment in software has been already achieved, additional investment is not 
so significant. In fact as shown in table 4.A.2 countries belonging to the so-
called “periphery” display a strong growth in software investment. Perhaps it is 
the same as with digital technologies: what matters is the use, not the 
endowment. Once the necessary requirements of software have been achieved, 
then the difference lies strictly in its strategic use. More concretely, in relation 
to the first research question, results obtained exhibit that the contribution of 
economic competencies - specifically vocational training and advertising and marketing - is 
the most important followed by that of innovative property to labour productivity 
growth. According to Bresnahan et al. (2002), organizational change should 
accompany ICT adoption in order to boost labour productivity growth. In the 
1995-2010 period, computerized information –specifically, software- reveals not to 
be statistically significant for labour productivity growth. It appears that, 
although being the intangible asset showing the highest investment rates 
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between 1995 and 2010, this does not turn out to be a significant contributor 
together with organizational capital to labour productivity growth.  
 
According to the European Competitiveness Report (2013), in the EU too 
little has been invested in the skills and organizational changes necessary to 
reap the benefits of ICT technologies. Lower investments in intangible assets 
(R&D, human capital, etc.) are likely to explain slow labour productivity 
growth as these factors affect a country’s absorptive capacity, i.e. its ability to 
take advantage of technology developed elsewhere (international technology 
transfers). Given that the bulk of technological innovations is concentrated in 
a few leading countries, improvements by the lagging countries in the 
absorptive capacity will be needed in order to assimilate foreign technologies. 
The empirical results show that ICT plays a key role in reducing inefficiencies 
in the use of resources. In addition, more upstream regulation significantly 
increases the efficiency gap. In other words, administrative restrictions 
imposed on service market competition have widespread negative effects on 
production efficiency. 
 
These results provide strong support for the hypothesis that a more 
competitive business environment reduces the efficiency gap. More flexible 
product market regulations, largely concentrated in key service-providing 
industries, are likely to raise efficiency levels across the whole economy. 
Regulatory changes in the labour market should also be tailored to restore the 
necessary balance between regular and temporary workers. 
 
Concerning the second research question posed, there are heterogeneous 
effects of investment in intangible assets on labour productivity growth in the 
different considered EU countries. Splitting the sample of EU member states 
in two groups permits to identify a significant differentiated behaviour 
between groups. But the characteristics of the countries inside each group are 
not homogenous enough to define only common measures addressing the 
improvement of labour productivity growth. The technological endowment 
and capabilities of the EU member states explain to a great extend their 
heterogeneous dynamics of convergence. Moreover, different studies show 
that the country’s dummy estimates on regional convergence tend to be 
significant, but they display very different coefficients indicating the presence 
of different steady states linked to the intrinsic characteristics of each country 
(Petrakos et al., 2011 and Bosa et al., 2010). This sustains that measures 
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promoting investment in intangibles at EU level should be accompanied by 
specific measures focusing each country’s needs for the purpose of promoting 
labour productivity growth. This fact provides the answer to the third research 
question on the implications in terms of industrial policy, which is an 
immediate consequence of the second research question and thus strongly 
related with it. 
 
In light of these findings the following conclusions can be drawn. First, related 
to our first research question, more importance should be paid to the 
intangibles category economic competencies. As Muntean (2014, p.37) states, 
empirical studies of intangible capital (Van Ark et al., 2009; Jona-Lasinio et al., 
2011; Thum and Roth, 2011 and 2013) indicate that other categories of 
intangibles, such as vocational training, advertising & marketing (brand equity) and 
organizational capital also contribute significantly to labour productivity growth. 
This contribution should not be ignored. Here too, our results are in line with 
Muntean (2014). Concerning vocational training, skills feature as a major policy 
element in the Europe 2020 agenda. The European Commission (2010) 
implemented an overall strategy for improving education and training systems 
via anticipation and investment in human capital supported by EU financial 
instruments, tools to monitor skills and training needs and trends, and specific 
initiatives to bring together the relevant actors. There are significant 
differences in skills achievements and in the effectiveness of vocational 
training systems across member states. The contribution of apprenticeships to 
supporting industrial competitiveness is widely recognised. Large differences 
in skills achievements and in effectiveness of vocational training systems across 
member states correlate with acute unemployment in crisis-hit member states. 
To invest in this intangible asset will influence positively advertising and 
marketing and organizational capital, as far as human capital is strongly related to 
these intangible assets. So, higher skills will result in an improved performance 
of these two assets.  
 
As in Roth and Thum (2013), our results also show that innovative property is not 
the main driver of labour productivity growth as expected from the guidelines 
of the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission, 2010), but economic 
competencies. 
 
For a long time R&D activities have been traditionally viewed as a main driver 
of innovation, as a result, they have been disproportionately encouraged by 
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governments in front of other intangibles assets that now have been revealed 
as equally or more relevant than R&D to labour productivity growth. One of 
the main criticisms to measure innovation through investment in R&D is that 
it does not seem to be a valid indicator for a country’s innovativeness. For 
sure that it is an appropriate indicator in countries like Germany with a strong 
manufacturing industry, but not in those countries with a high specialization in 
service activities, like UK. As Muntean (2014) affirms, governments around 
the world provide significant support for innovative activities in the 
manufacturing industry. The Lisbon Strategy and the Horizon 2020 Strategy points 
out the importance of R&D and innovation explicitly. But as the Horizon 2020 
Strategy recognizes intangible capital is the major determinant of innovation 
followed by R&D, which has revealed to be no longer such an important 
driver of innovation as initially, considered. Thus it is important to target 
precisely the different innovation measures in the Horizon 2020 Strategy in 
order to obtain best results when it comes to foster innovation in the EU. 
Further analysis examining the contribution of the different categories of 
intangibles to labour productivity growth has shown their importance in it and 
that focusing solely on R&D might provide a complete view of innovation. 
 
Our second conclusion related to the second and third research question is 
that European countries differ significantly in how heavily they invest in 
intangible assets (Corrado et al., 2012) and this is also reflected in their 
differentiated contribution to labour productivity growth as our results show. 
This hinders drawing a common pattern in their behaviour when it comes to 
define a unique policy measure to improve labour productivity growth by 
means of increasing intangible investment. It requires a new model of 
innovation and technological change helping countries to make a better use of 
their own innovative capabilities (Timmer et al., 2011). Investment in 
intangible assets as advertising and marketing, vocational training and organizational 
capital, as well as other intangible investments are closely related to each 
country’s needs, concretely, they are specific to individual firms. It is the firm 
that receive most of the benefits of such changes. Overall, according to our 
results, it can be concluded that the level of intangible investment in some 
countries, group 2 (figure 4.1 and table 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.A), seems to be 
insufficient when compared to group 1.  
 
In this context, the main conclusion concerning the implications in terms of 
industrial policy is that homogeneous policy measures at EU level should be 
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combined with specific measures focusing on the member states’ needs when 
it comes to promote intangible investment. In other words defining the same 
industrial policy measures for the different countries might not result in the 
expected objectives. By nature, capital investment is highly volatile and very 
sensitive to changes in economic conditions of the different countries. The 
tides and waves of investment usually follow business cycle expansions and 
downturns. This requires that policy measures should be designed focusing on 
the specific needs of investment in intangibles of the singles countries. As 
Blind and Georghiou (2010) state, research and innovation policy as well as 
other innovation-related policies should be coordinated at regional, national 
and European levels to maximise the benefits and minimise the cost. The 
commitment to innovation and the recognition that a knowledge- driven 
approach is fundamental to meeting the goals of economic recovery, social 
development and sustainability has led to a number of promising initiatives. 
There is evidence that Europe is not exploiting its innovation potential and 
that significant barriers are rooted in a lack of coordination between different 
policy initiatives and regulatory frameworks in both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. The vertical issue concerns coordination and effective subsidiarity 
among the European, national and regional levels, while the horizontal is 
concerned with bringing together the policies and institutions rooted in 
sectoral and regulatory domains but which are critical for innovation and the 
effective functioning of markets. 
 
As a result of recent research and analyzes, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 
2013d), recommend to update the present policy frameworks in order to take 
into account the relevance of intangible capital. Evidence suggests that the 
solution for the innovation deficit of some European countries, such as Spain 
and Italy consists not only of raising R&D expenditure across all types of 
industries of the EU member states (Piekkola, 2011). To do this, policies need 
to address specific barriers to innovation. First, a general innovation policy is 
necessary to improve the environment for innovation. For example, measures 
facilitating the interaction among innovators and addressing the lack of young 
firms in young R&D intensive sectors. These measures should aim to ease the 
interaction of the players in the innovation system and to guarantee a healthy 
competition. Second, policy measures that tackles concrete barriers that new 
firms have to deal with in new sectors, like the access to external financing for 
highly innovative projects.  
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Furthermore, the OECD proposes the following measures: that the 
accumulation of intangible capital should be promoted through product 
market liberalization; bankruptcy regimes should also be acquiescent in front 
of business failures; a focus on broad concepts innovation, and labour market 
reforms. The OECD also warns that public policy to maximize the growth 
potential of knowledge-based capital may have ambiguous effects and trade-
offs may emerge with other policy goals. Therefore, more investigation is 
needed to go a step further in the analysis of the measurement and the 
understanding of intangibles, refining the estimates of the contribution of 
intangibles to labour productivity growth for the single branches that 
conforms the manufacturing industry. This is crucial for the design of policy 
measures focusing on the different sectors in manufacturing industry, so that 
governments will have a more complete understanding of the state of 
manufacturing industry investment in intangibles; and whether support 
measures are needed to spur and promote such investment (Muntean, 2014, p. 
37 and OECD 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). 
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Chapter 5: Concluding remarks and future 
research 
 
5.1. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
This dissertation has examined the poor performance of labour productivity 
growth in manufacturing for a sample of European Union (EU) member 
states in the last decades in view of the existence of persisting differences 
among them. The motivation was to investigate the causes that hinder labour 
productivity to recover from the crisis that started in 2008 and attain a stable 
growing pace. Chapters 2 and 3 were devoted to investigate the existence of 
labour productivity differences, to assess their magnitude and analyze the role 
of industry specialization as well as to determine to what extent theses 
differences arise from changes in the production structure, from labour 
productivity itself or a combination of both. Chapter 4 analyzed which of the 
different intangible assets contribute most to labour productivity growth. This 
last chapter summarizes the main findings and concluding remarks as well as 
their limitations. Industrial policy implications are also described and future 
research on this topic is proposed. 
 
Chapter 2 started the analysis by focusing on the concern of the productivity 
slowdown in manufacturing since the mids 1990s and the persisting 
heterogeneity in its performance among EU member states (Mas et al., 2012; 
Timmer et al. 2010). A comparative analysis between Germany and Spain, 
respectively as representatives for the centre and the periphery, is undertaken 
in order to determine the existence of these differences and obtain 
information on the determinants that deprive labour productivity in 
manufacturing from a better performance, to assess its magnitude and also the 
influence of industry specialization. Results show that differences are 
significant and persistent and that it is mainly a problem of productivity itself. 
Despite an increasing employment rate and a strong capital accumulation, 
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Spain’s manufacturing ability to generate value added is poor in comparison to 
Germany. This indicates that it is not a problem of factors’ accumulation 
(Corrado et al., 2014; Corrado et al., 2012; Mas et al., 2012) and that this 
difficulty to improve labour productivity performance is both intersectoral and 
also intra-sectoral. To a lesser extent industry specialization influences this 
performance, albeit its displays a growing trend. Thus differences in industry 
structure do not provide a full explanation of the existing differences in labour 
productivity. 
 
Next, since behaviour of economy is mainly the result of the aggregation of 
different sectors and of labour productivity dynamics (Martino, 2014, Mas et 
al., 2012), in chapter 3 we have examined to what extent aggregate labour 
productivity changes arise from sectoral structure changes, from labour 
productivity differentials or a combination of both in Spain and Germany. 
Findings were expected to point out the need to implement industrial policy 
measures in order to foster high-performing productivity in manufacturing 
branches as well as to obtain information for the design of efficient and 
strategic industrial policy measures (Dhéret, 2014; Pianta, 2013 and O’Sullivan 
et al., 2013). Results have confirmed that differences arise mainly from labour 
productivity differentials itself and to a lesser extent from structural changes.  
 
Chapter 4 was devoted to investigate and to assess the role of different 
intangible assets on labour productivity growth in manufacturing. To this end, 
we have implemented the analysis for a set of 9 EU member states. A closer 
study of the data has allowed us to identify a differentiated behaviour among 
them both in terms of gross value added growth and labour productivity 
growth. As a consequence, to deepen the analysis we have split the sample 
into two groups with the aim to study their differentiated evolution. 
Investment in intangibles assets have shown up as important contributors of 
labour productivity growth (Corrado et al., 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2013; 
Muntean, 2014; Ilmakkunas and Piekkola, 2014 and Roth and Thum, 2013). 
The intention was to go a step further and determine which intangible asset 
type belonging the different intangibles’ categories are the main contributors 
of it. We expected results would shed some light on designing strategic and 
efficient industrial policy measures helping in attaining a better performance of 
labour productivity growth. Findings indicated that vocational training and 
advertising and marketing are the main drivers of labour productivity growth. 
They also confirm that grouping the sample of 9 EU member states into two 
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groups allows identifying a differentiated behaviour among them. But, at the 
same time, results also support for the presence of heterogeneity inside each 
group. 
 
From the study implemented in this dissertation several conclusions can be 
drawn. Firstly, differences in labour productivity can be mainly attributed to 
productivity itself and not so much to manufacturing industry structure 
differences. Secondly, differences in industry structure do not totally justify the 
gap in productivity. Taking Spain as benchmark for countries belonging to the 
so-called “periphery” (Dhéret, 2014), it can be concluded that some of them 
may have difficulties to change its productive structure at a faster pace. Our 
results have shown that Spain’s manufacturing industry is characterized as a 
traditional one, where low and medium technology branches generate the 
greatest part of value added. In contrast, in Germany the bulk is on the high 
and medium technology branches, but the situation in Spain is changing 
although very slowly. In the analyzed period the employment rate and the 
capital stock in Spanish manufacturing increased significantly in comparison to 
German manufacturing (Corrado et al., 2014; Corrado et al., 2012; Mas et al., 
2012). From this we can conclude that labour productivity differences are not 
Mainly a matter of factors’ accumulation. Against this background, one would 
have expected a better performance of labour productivity in Spain and a 
greater ability to generate value added. But on the contrary, Spanish labour 
productivity remains poor; differences with Germany have grown. In contrast 
to Germany, Spanish manufacturing shows up an unfavourable specialization 
in some more knowledge-intensive activities thus limiting the potential to 
improve labour productivity performance and international competitiveness. 
Furthermore, as a consequence Spain’s manufacturing produces lower quality 
goods than Germany, which can be mainly attributed to the fact that 
employment created in the considered period consists mainly of low skilled 
workers (Mas et al., 2012). This may explain the reduced ability to generate 
value added, the poor performance of labour productivity and the existing 
quality gap (Lladós-Masllorens and Fernández-Sirera; 2004) in comparison to 
Germany regarding the goods produced. A plausible explanation is the 
reduced absorptive capacity of new technologies by low skilled workers, who 
occupy the new created positions, which results in difficulties to produce 
medium to high quality goods. As a consequence, Spain’s competitiveness in 
the international markets is affected negatively. At this point, it is important to 
point out that our findings indicate that the differences in labour productivity 
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are cross-sectional as well as within sectors, indicating that it is not an isolated 
problem of few branches, but of the whole manufacturing. All this hinders 
them from attaining a better performance of labour productivity growth and 
thus catching up with the “centre” (Dhéret, 2014). Thirdly, intangibles assets 
belonging to the category economic competencies are the main drivers of labour 
productivity growth, but its importance is not homogenous across the member 
states of the sample. The existence of heterogeneous effects of investment in 
intangibles indicates that this fact should be taken into account when it comes 
to design industrial policy measures in European Union.  
 
All this highlights the need for a new industrial policy (European Commission, 
2014; O’Sullivan et al., 2013; Veugelers, 2013; Crafts and Hughes, 2013) new in 
the sense that it should combine measures addressing specific difficulties of 
the EU member states as well as common ones. This is a consequence of the 
changing nature of global manufacturing which can be concreted as stated by 
O’Sullivan et al. (2013) in the declining share of manufacturing activities in 
OECD countries, the increasing competition from emerging economies; 
growing demands for resource-efficient manufacturing; the complexity and 
importance of global manufacturing chains and the accelerating pace of 
technological change. The decline in manufacturing has affected almost all 
manufacturing sectors, albeit with different intensity and with different 
explanations: demand effects, productivity effects and/or trade effects. As 
Dhéret (2014) states, despite the creation of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, the EU has been characterized by significant divergences in 
manufacturing performance and there is no doubt that the Economic and 
Monetary Union is far from being homogenous in this regard. Nowadays, the 
EU is composed, on the one hand, of strong manufacturing bases in countries 
like Germany which hold a robust position on global markets and whose 
model is clearly export-oriented and, on the other hand, Member States with 
relatively high commercial deficits (France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy) and 
in some cases, little diversity in their manufacturing industrial sectors. 
 
Although EU is showing a reversion of this trend, recovery remains modest. 
The agenda’s Europe 2020 major objective is to promote growth and 
competitiveness to achieve a stable and strong manufacturing base. The 
increasing interdependencies between manufacturing value chains, production 
technologies and services sectors generated a complex network which difficult 
the design of industrial policy measures. 
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Against this background the challenge for the EU manufacturing is to attain 
and maintain a broad and well-diversified manufacturing base in Europe, 
taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the member states’ 
manufacturing (European Competitiveness Report, 2013). The role of 
industrial policy -be horizontal or vertical- is to rule changes in production 
and, in particular, to enable processes to substantially increase productivity. As 
noted by the European Commission (2005 and 2014), the health of the 
manufacturing sector is essential for economic growth. In addition the 
industry has spillover effects that far outweigh the services, particularly 
regarding intermediate consumption. 
 
Traditionally, market failures and structural coordination problems (O’Sullivan et al., 
2013; Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2013; Lin, 2012) centered the discussion on 
industrial policy as main rationales for government intervention. Recently, 
arguments for industrial policy measures have been enriched and reformulated 
embracing notions of systems failure, these are related to dynamics of innovation 
and technical change. The systems approach results from the coordination 
problems that arise from the promotion of development, awareness and 
implementation of new technological opportunities (Crafts and Hughes, 2013). 
 
These problems indicate that the design of industrial policy measures should 
take into account broader industrial dynamics, going beyond the firm, sector 
and macroeconomic levels. This explains why policy makers use the term 
“new industrial policy”. 
 
So, when it comes to design industry policy measures and taking into account 
the results and conclusions obtained in this dissertation study, in line with 
other authors as Veugelers and Cincera (2015), European Commission (2014), 
O’Sullivan et al. (2013) and Owen (2012), the proposed key elements for a new 
industrial strategy are as follows:  
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1. Strengthen the internal market and increase the participation in global value chains 
(GVC) 
Strengthening the internal market by providing the necessary infrastructures, 
establishing a stable and predictable regulatory and institutional framework 
that favour entrepreneurship and innovation, integrate capital markets, 
promotes training and citizens’ mobility and completes the internal market for 
services as a driver of industrial competitiveness (European Commission, 2014 
and Veugelers and Sapir, 2013) will allow to increase and benefit from the 
participation in Global value chains (GVC). GVC implies upstream and 
downstream interconnections which results in a greater interdependence 
among countries. This growing interconnectedness limits the benefits of 
national policies, requiring more coordinated policies at international level. To 
this end, industrial policy measures should focus on establishing the adequate 
framework to consolidate and expand the internal market. It is important to 
guarantee internal and external openness for the integration into international 
production networks. As global production networks rely on logistics and 
communication chains, it is necessary to eliminate barriers in sectors such as 
transport, communications and telecommunications, energy, finance and 
business services. In this context, to promote the single market in these areas 
is a necessary condition, due to the fact that progress is still to be made, 
specifically in the energy and services markets. 
 
2. Aid to promote the competitiveness of strategic cross-sectoral manufacturing- based 
activities. 
First of all, it is relevant to go beyond the manufacturing firms, sectors and 
macroeconomic framework and focus on cross-sectoral manufacturing-based 
activities. The concrete measures are expected to influence across multiple 
sectors and along different supply chains of the manufacturing systems. To 
this end, it is relevant to determine which activities are strategic ones and to 
identify their significant features. These are namely the international market 
orientation, high technological intensity, high value added, high productivity, 
ability to generate employment and high quality industrial network, energy 
efficiency and sustainability. Secondly, it might be necessary to promote 
structural changes in manufacturing. Thus in order to achieve changes in the 
productive structure, industrial policy measures should address a reduction of 
entry barriers. This can be materialized in providing support to new 
companies, in helping in the development and the marketing of new products 
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as well as to identify new markets or market niches (European 
Competitiveness Report, 2013).  
 
3. Promoting innovation and R & D: 
As long as innovation and R&D directly affect the internal and external 
competitiveness and growth of manufacturing, a significant increase in both of 
them is needed. There are still differences among member states in terms of 
stock of knowledge as well as in the capacities to leverage knowledge into 
growth. Results obtained in this thesis emphasize the importance of 
investment in intangible assets as drivers of labour productivity growth and 
the heterogeneity existent among member states. The increase in innovative 
effort cannot succeed without a backing up the most innovative sectors, 
generating major technological externalities, such as biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, space, incorporating an ambitious plan to attract foreign 
investment. Innovation policy should improve the environment for innovation 
by setting the adequate institutional framework in order to further the 
integration of European capital, labour and product and services markets. That 
is, to ease the interaction of the players in the innovation system and at the 
same time to guarantee a healthy competition (Veugelers and Cincera, 2015).  
 
4. The maintenance and expansion of the training and qualification of all workers. 
A good example to follow is the one carried out by Austria and Germany with 
its system of dual vocational training, further reducing youth unemployment 
(Heymann and Vetter, 2013). Results obtained in this dissertation display 
vocational training as one of the main drivers of labour productivity growth. 
As jobs are shifting from classic routine activities towards higher value-added 
positions, skills requirements are higher. As a consequence adjustment 
difficulties are likely to arise resulting in job losses affecting heavily certain 
countries and manufacturing sectors. In front of this, effective measures as 
facilitating the attainment of new skills are needed to soften the impact and 
reallocate the displaced workers. Improving the functioning of labour markets 
and promoting education and training becomes key policy measures.  
 
5. Measures to support entrepreneurs and SMEs. 
It is well known that the size of the company affects its productivity, 
innovation capacity, commercial and productive internationalization as well as 
the cost of funding. The main lines of action should intend to achieve the 
objectives of promoting entrepreneurship and improving access to finance. 
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6. To promote the internationalization of businesses to international markets in order to 
improve manufacturing external competitiveness.  
To build a modern and competitive industrial sector is necessary to promote 
the internationalization of its actors. This means to pay attention the 
development of the tradable sector. 
 
All in all, industrial policy measures at EU level should guarantee that Europe 
attains a broad and diversified manufacturing base in order to preserve 
manufacturing capabilities. To this end, it is important to ensure that the 
industrial structure is well-equipped to develop new areas of activity. All these 
measures imply a change in the production structure in order to improve 
labour productivity and, furthermore, display the need to focus on sectors 
with competitive advantages and high growth potential in both value added 
and technological innovation. As Myro (2014) says, to implement all these 
industrial policy measures major changes in the nature, structure and 
competitive framework of the businesses as well as in their technological, 
educational and international promotion environment are required in order to 
set the base for a sustainable productivity growth and to achieve greater 
competitiveness. 
 
Previous analysis in this thesis has some limitations. First, it would have been 
of interest to extent the investigation by considering a broader time span, as 
Great Recession is so recent, nowadays it is difficult to assess its impact with 
more detail. For this reason it would be interesting to replicate the analysis 
some years later in order to get a broader perspective of its consequences and 
its recovery path. Concerning chapter 2 and 3 it would have been interesting 
to deepen the analysis of the difficulties that Spanish manufacturing has in 
combining the creation of new jobs with positive labour productivity gains by 
examining the influence of labour market regulations and the protectionist 
behaviour (Mas et al., 2012). A comparative analysis examining which kind of 
measures are being implemented in both manufactures to improve human 
capital and to what extent they are successful as well as to identify and to 
evaluate sectoral policy measures enhancing structural change in 
manufacturing (Martino, 2014; Aghion et al., 2011) might have been helpful in 
obtaining information on how to overcome the difficulties to reverse the trend 
in the Spanish case. As shown in chapter 4, detailed study on cross-country 
labour productivity performance requires international comparability of 
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national statistics. The increasing role of ICT, intangible capital and market 
services in economic growth in the last decades renewed the attention to 
measurement issues (Corrado et al., 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2014; Timmer et al., 
2010; Griliches, 1992; Schreyer, 2008; Sichel, 1997; Triplett and Bosworth, 
2008). As measurement and comparability problems of ICT and intangible 
assets investment, output measurement of market services among others 
arose, a big effort has been done in this field by improving and updating 
databases and measures. But still some issues remains unsolved as for 
example, to obtain internationally comparable data at more disaggregated level 
for manufacturing as well as for market services (Timmer et al., 2010). Thus as 
new and more updated databases are available we think it may be interesting to 
go a step further with the present study. In chapter 4 we have shown how 
single or combined intangible assets are important drivers of labour 
productivity growth. Second, the limitation in this case stems from the fact 
that intangible assets’ measurement still faces great challenges as for example 
the choice of depreciation rates, investment price deflators, incomplete data 
on business expenditures as training and firm-specific human capital and 
management capital and the fact that that the existing accounting strategy and 
techniques of expenditures on intangible assets vary among firms (Yallwe and 
Buscemi, 2014; Baldwin et al. 2012; Al-Twaijry, 2009).  
 
5.2. Future research 
Related to the analysis of the performance of labour productivity growth there 
are a number of areas where greater emphasis on further research is required. 
For instance, in a context of increasing interlinkages between the 
manufacturing and services, where manufacturing production depends more 
and more on innovation and specialized service inputs (European 
Competitiveness Report, 2013), we think might be of interest to include in the 
analysis the services sector. There are more drivers for a highly productive and 
competitive manufacturing sector than merely R&D and innovation. 
Manufacturing companies are becoming more dependent on sophisticated 
services inputs with the purpose to differentiate products and charge higher 
price-cost mark-ups. This highlights the fact that goods and services often 
complement each other (Nordås and Kim, 2013). To include services sector 
would provide more detailed information on the factors that hinders a faster 
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recovery from the crisis. Not doing this would provide just a partial view of 
labour productivity performance in manufacturing. 
 
Another interesting issue for future research is to examine in more detail the 
measurement of intangibles by manufacturing sectors and firms, with a 
breakdown of worker characteristics as skill levels (Timmer and Van Ark, 
2005). This is essential for any performance-based analysis. Ilmakkunas and 
Piekkola (2014) have shown that savings in labour costs explains how 
organizational capital improves the profitability of high-productivity firms. 
They demonstrate that the share of labour costs promotes investment in 
intangible capital at long-term and it is supposed to vary by type of sector and 
by type of work.  
 
Furthermore, to focus on the components of investment in intangible assets, 
the interactions among them as well as with other drivers of labour 
productivity growth are required (Al-Twaijry, 2009; Bresnahan et al., 2002; 
Brynjolfsson et al., 2002) for a better understanding of their interlinkages and 
for the design of industrial policy measures. To this end it is relevant to 
improve the measures of intangible assets and to refine the estimates of the 
contribution of intangibles to labour productivity growth. 
 
In front of the persisting differences in labour productivity performance 
among EU member states it is essential to continue investigating the causes in 
order to identify concrete measures to improve this underperformance of the 
so-called “periphery”. As pointed out in chapters 2 and 3 it is mainly a 
problem of productivity itself, although a slight change in production structure 
is taking place. Lower investments in intangible assets (R&D, human capital 
etc.) may explain to some extent why they are lagging behind the “centre” as 
these variables influence the countries’ absorptive capacity, that is, their ability 
in taking advantage of the technology developed by other countries. For these 
laggard countries it is necessary to develop a minimum degree of absorptive 
capacity to assimilate and exploit the foreign knowledge in the production of 
their goods. This will permit them to narrow the gap with the “centre” and 
boost labour productivity. Furthermore, it affects negatively their 
competitiveness in the international markets due to the lower quality of the 
goods produced generating differences in the quality with respect to the ones 
produced by manufacturing industries specialized in medium-high technology 
branches In this context, it would be interesting to analyze to what extent the 
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resulting quality gap might influence negatively external trade and 
competitiveness. Differences in this indicator between countries are largely 
explained by differences in the capacity for innovation and productivity 
(Lladós-Masllorens and Fernández-Sirera, 2004).  
 
Against this background it important to assess to what extent regulatory 
framework may condition the efficiency with which resources are used in 
production. In the last decade the ability to exploit existing resources has 
turned out as essential drivers of productivity gains in many mature economies 
(Van Ark et al., 2012). For this reason it is important to understand the 
underpinnings of the regulatory environment in determining technical 
efficiency and labour productivity. To examine to what extent the institutional 
framework and laws as well as the EU regulatory settings impose restriction in 
the product, labour and financial markets as well as the role of intangible 
assets, absorptive capacity and the dynamics of structural change may shed 
some light on the causes for the hetereogeneous labour productivity 
performance among EU member states (Piekkola, 2011; European 
Competitive Report, 2013; Veugelers, 2013 and Veugelers and Cincera, 2015). 
 
To broaden and deepen the analysis of labour productivity performance by 
considering a bigger sample of countries is another objective for future 
research. It would provide more complete information relevant for the design 
of measures addressing a positive behavior and thus resulting in strong and 
stable economic growth and improved competitiveness. 
 
Finally, another topic for future research is to examine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of industrial policy measures in achieving a better labour 
productivity performance. Martino (2014) and Petrakos et al. (2011) suggest 
that EU policies intended to promote convergence and cohesion have failed. 
Agglomeration economies, geography, economic integration and structure are 
important contributors of economic growth and of labour productivity growth 
(Petrakos et al., 2011). For these reason to identify which policies have 
contributed to the persistence of underperformance and which have improved 
it becomes essential to single out the most effective and efficient. In this 
context, it is relevant to pay special attention on measures addressing structural 
reforms and their impact.  
 
 
Chapter 5 

 101 
 
5.3. References 
Aghion, P., Boulanger, J. and Cohen, E. (2011). “Rethinking Industrial 
Policy”, Brueghel Policy Brief, Issue 2011/04, 1-8. 
Al-Twaijry, A. (2009). “Intangible assets and future growth: evidence from 
Japan”, Asian Review of Accounting, 17 (1), 23–39. 
Andreoni, A. and Scazzieri, R. (2014). “Triggers of Change: Structural 
Trajectories and Production Dynamics”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
38 (6), 1391-1408. 
Baldwin, J.R., Gu, W. and Mac Donald, R. (2012). “Intangible Capital and 
Productivity Growth in Canada”, The Canadian Productivity Review, 29, 1-44. 
Bresnahan, T., Brynjolfsson, E. and Hitt, L. M. (2002). “Information 
Technology, Work-place Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: 
Firm-level Evidence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1), 339-376. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Hitt, L. M. and Yang, S. (2002). “Intangible Assets: 
Computers and Organizational Capital”, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2001- 1, 137–98. 
Corrado, C.; Haskel, J., Jona-Lasinio, C. and Iommi, M. (2012). “Intangible 
Capital and Growth in Advanced Economies: Measurement Methods 
and Comparative Results”, IZA Discussion Paper 6733. Available at 
ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp6733.pdf 
Corrado, C., Haskel, J., Jona-Lasinio, C. and Iommi, M. (2013). “Innovation 
and intangible investment in Europe, Japan, and the United States”, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29 (2), 261-286.  
Corrado, C., Haskel, J., Jona-Lasinio, C. and Iommi, M. (2014). “Intangibles 
and industry productivity growth?: Evidence from the EU”, Intan-Invest, 
(July), 1–30. Available at 
http://www.coinvest.org.uk/pub/IntanInvest/WebHome/INTAN-
Invest_Harmonized_Industry_Estimates.pdf 
Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2005). “Measuring Capital and 
Technology: An Expanded Framework”, in C. Corrado, J. Haltiwanger, 
and D. Sichel (eds), Measuring Capital in the New Economy, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Income and Wealth, 65, 11-45, 
The University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2006). “Intangible Capital and 
Economic Growth”, NBER Working Paper 11948, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Chapter 5 
 102 
 
Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2009). “Intangible capital and US 
economic growth”, Review of Income and Wealth, 55 (3), 661–685. 
Crafts, N. and Hughes, A. (2013). “Industrial Policy for the medium to long –
Term”, Centre for Business Research, University Of Cambridge Working 
Paper, 455. Available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk.  
Dhéret, C. (2014). “Sharing the same vision – The cornerstone of a new 
industrial policy for Europe”, Discussions Paper (20th of March 2014), 
European Policy Centre, 1-15. Available at http://www.epc.eu 
European Commission (2005). “Implementing the Community Lisbon 
Programme: A policy framework to strengthen EU manufacturing - 
towards a more integrated approach for industrial policy”, COM (2005) 
474, Brussels. 
European Commission (2014). “For a European Industrial Renaissance”, 
SWD 14 Final COM (2014) 25, Brussels 
European Competitiveness Report (2013). “Towards knowledge-driven 
Reindustrialisation”. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-
competitiveness/competitiveness-analysis/european-competitiveness-
report/files/eu-2013-eur-comp-rep_en.pdf 
Griliches, Z. (1992). “Output Measurement in the Service Sectors”, NBER 
Studies in Income and Wealth, 56, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Heymann, E. and Vetter, S. (2013), “Europe’s re-industrialisation: the gulf 
between aspiration and reality”, EU Monitor, Deutsche Bank. Available at 
http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3814/Resurrecting_in
dustrial_policy.html  
Ilmakunnas, P. and Piekkola, H. (2014). “Intangible investment in people and 
productivity”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 41, 443-456.  
Lladós-Masllorens, J. and Fernández Sirera, T. (2004). “La indústria catalana a 
Europa en el context de l’ampliació”, Nota d’Economia, 78. Generalitat 
de Catalunya. 
Martino, R. (2014). “Convergence and growth. Labour productivity dynamics 
in the European Union”, Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), 
1–27, Université de Strasbourg. 
Mas, M. et al. (2012). Industrial Productivity in Europe: Growth and Crisis. 
Editors: Matilde Mas & Robert Stehrer. Edward Elgar Editors. 
Muntean, T. (2014). “Intangible Assets and Their Contribution to Labour 
Productivity Growth in Ontario”, International Productivity Monitor, 27, 22–
40. 
Chapter 5 
103 
 
Myro, R. (2014). “Una nueva política para la industria”, Mediterráneo Económico, 
25, 297-313. Caja Mar. 
O’Sullivan, E., Andreoni, A., López-Gómez, C. and Gregory, M. (2013). 
“What is new in the new industrial policy? A manufacturing systems 
perspective”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29 (2), 432-462. 
Owen, G. (2012). “Industrial policy in Europe since the Second World War: 
what has been learnt?”, ECIPE Occasional paper, 1. The European Centre 
for International Political Economy, Brussels, Belgium. Available at: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41902/. 
Petrakos, G., Kallioras, D. and Anagnostou, A. (2011). “Regional Convergence 
and Growth in Europe: understanding patterns and determinants”, 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 18 (4) 375–391. 
Pianta, M. (2013). “An Industrial Policy for Europe”, Socialist Project, Global 
Research and also as paper for the 19th Conference on Alternative Economic 
Policy in Europe, London 20-22 Sept 2013. 
Piekkola, H. (2011). “Intangible capital: The key to growth in Europe”, 
Intereconomics, 46 (2), 222–228. doi:10.1007/s10272-011-0387-2 
Roth, F. and Thum, A. E. (2013). “Intangible capital and labor productivity 
growth: Panel evidence for the EU from 1998-2005”, Review of Income and 
Wealth, 59 (3), 486–508.  
Schreyer, P. (2008). “International Comparisons of Levels of Capital Input and 
Multifactor Productivity”, German Economic Review, 8 (2), 237-254. 
Sichel, D. (1997). “The Productivity Slowdown: Is a Growing Unmeasurable 
Sector the Culprit?”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79 (3), 367-370. 
Timmer, M. P. and Van Ark, B. (2005). “Does Information and 
communication Technology drive EU-US Productivity Growth 
Differentials?”, Oxford Economic Papers, 57, 693-716. 
Timmer, M. P., Inklaar, R., O’Mahony, M. and van Ark, B (2010). Economic 
growth in Europe. A comparative industry perspective. Cambridge University 
Press, ISBN 978-0-521-19887-5 Hardback. 
Triplett, J. E. and Bosworth, B. P. (2008). “The State of Data for Services 
Productivity Measurement in the United States”, International Productivity 
Monitor, 16, 53-70. 
Van Ark, B., Levanon, G, Chen, V. and Cheng, B., (2012). “Performance 
2011: Productivity, employment and growth in the world’s economies”, 
Research Report R_-1475-11-RR, The Conference Board. 
Chapter 5 
104 
 
Veugelers, R. (2013). “Manufacturing Europe’s future growth”, in 
Manufacturing Europe’s Future, 1-6. Reinhilde Veugelers Ed. Brueguel 
Blueprint Series Vol XXI. Belgium. Available at www.bruegel.org 
Veugelers, R. and Cincera, M. (2015). “How to Turn on the Innovation 
Growth Machine in Europe. The Impact of Horizon 2020 on 
Innovation in Europe”, Intereconomics 2015. Review of European Economic 
Policy, 50 (1). 
Veugelers, R. and Sapir, A. (2013). “Policies for manufacturing EU growth”, in 
Manufacturing Europe’s Future, 161-174. Reinhilde Veugelers Ed. 
Brueguel Blueprint Series Vol XXI. Belgium. Available at 
www.bruegel.org 
Yallwe, A. H. and Buscemi, A. (2014). “An Era of Intangible Assets”, Journal of 
Applied Finance & Banking, 4 (5), 17–26. 
 
Chapter 5 
References 
105 
 
References 
Abowd, J. M., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R., Lane, J., Lengermann, P., McCue, 
K., McKinney, K., and Sandusky, K. (2005). “The Relation Among 
Human Capital, Productivity and Market Value: Building Up from 
Micro Evidence”, in C. Corrado, J. Haltiwanger, and D. Sichel (eds), 
Measuring Capital in the New Economy, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, IL, 153–204, 2005. 
Aghion, P., Boulanger, J. and Cohen, E. (2011). “Rethinking Industrial 
Policy”, Brueghel Policy Brief, Issue 2011/04, 1-8. 
Al-Twaijry, A. (2009). “Intangible assets and future growth: evidence from 
Japan”, Asian Review of Accounting, 17 (1), 23–39. 
Andreoni, A. and Scazzieri, R. (2014). “Triggers of Change: Structural 
Trajectories and Production Dynamics”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
38 (6), 1391-1408. 
Arcelus, F. J. (1984). “An Extension of Shift-Share Analysis”, Growth and 
Change, January, 15 (1), 3-8. 
Baldwin, J.R., Gu, W. and Mac Donald, R. (2012). “Intangible Capital and 
Productivity Growth in Canada”, The Canadian Productivity Review, 29, 1-
44. 
Barnes, P. and McClure, A. (2009). “Investments in Intangible Assets and 
Australia’s Productivity Growth”, Productivity Commission Staff Working 
Paper, 2009. 
Belhocine, N. (2009). “Treating Intangible Inputs as Investment Goods: The 
Impact on Canadian GDP”, IMF Working Paper , 240. 
Bernard, Andrew B. and Jones, Charles I. (1996). “Comparing Apples to 
Oranges: Productivity Convergence and Measurement across Industries 
and Countries”, The American Economic Review, 86 (5), 1216-1238. 
Blind, K. and Georghiou, L. (2010). “Drivers and Impediments for Innovation 
in Europe”, Forum Intereconomics, 5, 264-269. Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) DOI: 10.1007/s10272-010-0346-3 
References 
 
106 
 
Bosa, J.W.B., Economidoua, C. and Koetterb, M. (2010). “Technology Clubs, 
R&D and Growth Patterns: Evidence form EU Manufacturing”, 
European Economic Review, 54 (1), 60-79. 
Bresnahan, T., Brynjolfsson, E. and Hitt, L. M. (2002). “Information 
Technology, Work-place Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: 
Firm-level Evidence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1), 339-376. 
Brynjolfsson, E. and Hitt, L. (2000). “Beyond computation: information 
technology, organizational transformation and business performance”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 23–48. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Hitt, L. M. and Yang, S. (2002). “Intangible Assets: 
Computers and Organizational Capital”, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2001- 1, 137–98. 
Callejón, M. and García-Quevedo, J. (2011). “Nuevas tendencias en las 
políticas de innovación”, Papeles de Economía Española, 127, 177-192.  
Cañibano, L., Garcia-Ayuso, M. and Sánchez, P. (2000). “Accounting for 
Intangibles: A Literature Review”, Journal of Accounting Literature, 19, 
102–130. 
Chun, H., Fukao, K., Hisa, S. and Miyagawa, T. (2012). “Measurement of 
Intangible Investments by Industry and Its Role in Productivity 
Improvement Utilizing Comparative Studies between Japan and 
Korea”, RIETI Discussion Paper Series, 12-E-037, 35. The Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. Retrieved from 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/12e037.pdf 
Coe, D. T. and Helpman, E. (1995). “International R&D Spillovers”, European 
Economic Review, 39, 859–887. 
Corrado, C.; Haskel, J., Jona-Lasinio, C. and Iommi, M. (2012). “Intangible 
Capital and Growth in Advanced Economies: Measurement Methods 
and Comparative Results”, IZA Discussion Paper 6733. Available at 
ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp6733.pdf 
Corrado, C., Haskel, J., Jona-Lasinio, C. and Iommi, M. (2013). “Innovation 
and intangible investment in Europe, Japan, and the United States”, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29 (2), 261-286.  
Corrado, C., Haskel, J., Jona-Lasinio, C. and Iommi, M. (2014a). “Intangibles 
and industry productivity growth?: Evidence from the EU”, Intan-Invest, 
(July), 1–30. Retrieved from 
http://www.coinvest.org.uk/pub/IntanInvest/WebHome/INTAN-
Invest_Harmonized_Industry_Estimates.pdf 
 107 
 
Corrado, C., Haskel, J., Jona-Lasinio, C. and Iommi, M. (2014b). 
“Internationally comparable macro-estimates of investment in 
intangible assets at the industry level: INTAN – Invest”, available at 
www.INTAN-Invest.net 
Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2005) “Measuring Capital and 
Technology: An Expanded Framework”, in C. Corrado, J. Haltiwanger, 
and D. Sichel (eds), Measuring Capital in the New Economy, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Income and Wealth, 65, 11-
45, The University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2006). “Intangible Capital and 
Economic Growth”, NBER Working Paper, 11948, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2009). “Intangible capital and US 
economic growth”, Review of Income and Wealth, 55 (3), 661–685. 
Crafts, N. and Hughes, A. (2013). “Industrial Policy for the medium to long –
Term”, Centre for Business Research, University Of Cambridge 
Working Paper, 455. Available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk.  
Crafts, N., (2010). “Overview and Policy Implications”, in BIS (ed.), Learning 
from some of Britain’s Successful Sectors: An Historical Analysis of the 
Role of Government, BIS Economics Papers, 6, March, 1-17. 
Dal Borgo, M., Goodridge, P., Haskel, J., and Pesole, A. (2013). “Productivity 
and growth in UK industries: An intangible investment approach”, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 75, 806–834.  
Dhéret, C. (2014). “Sharing the same vision – The cornerstone of a new 
industrial policy for Europe”, Discussions Paper, European Policy Centre, 1-
15. Available at www.epc.eu. 
Edquist, H. (2011). “Intangible Investment and the Swedish Manufacturing 
and Service Sector Paradox”, The Review of Income and Wealth, 57 (4), 
658–682. 
Esteban, J. (1972). “A Reinterpretation of Shift-Share Analysis”, Regional and 
Urban Economics, 2, 249-261. 
Esteban, J. (1994). “La desigualdad interregional en Europa y en España: 
Descripción y análisis”, in Caminal, R., Esteban, J., de la Fuente, A., 
Vives, X. (Eds.), Crecimiento y convergencia Regional en España y en 
Europa, Vol. 2, Fundación de Economía Analítica, Barcelona, 13-84. 
Esteban, J, (2000). “Regional Convergence in Europe and the Industry Mix: A 
Shift-Share Analysis”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 30, 353-364. 
References 
108 
 
EU KLEMS (2009). “EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts 
database”, available at http://www.euklems.net . 
EU KLEMS (2012). “EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts 
database”, available at http://www.euklems.net . 
European Commission (2005). “Implementing the Community Lisbon 
Programme: A policy framework to strengthen EU manufacturing - 
towards a more integrated approach for industrial policy”, COM (2005) 
474, Brussels. 
European Commission (2009a). “European Industry in a Changing World. 
Updated Sectoral Overview 2009”, COM (2009) 204, Brussels. 
European Commission (2009b). “EU Industrial structure 2009 - Performance 
and competitiveness: Executive Summary”, European Commission, 
Enterprise and Industry, Brussels. 
European Commission (2010). “An integrated industrial policy for the 
globalization era”, COM (2010) 614, Brussels. 
European Commission (2010). “Product Market Review 2010-2011”, European 
Economy, 8. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
European Commission. 
European Commission (2012). “A stronger European industry for growth and 
economic recovery”, COM (2012) 582. 
European Commission (2014). “For a European Industrial Renaissance”, 
SWD 14 Final COM (2014) 25, Brussels 
European Competitiveness Report (2013). “Towards knowledge-driven 
Reindustrialisation”. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-
competitiveness/competitiveness-analysis/european-competitiveness-
report/files/eu-2013-eur-comp-rep_en.pdf 
Eurostat (2013). “Industrial production up by 0.7 per cent in euro area”, 
Eurostat news release, 121, 13 August 2013.  
Fabricant, S. (1942). “Productivity of Labour in Peace and War”, NBER 
Occasional Paper, 7, 1-29. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9271.pdf 
Falk, M. (2013). “New Empirical Findings for International Investment in 
Intangible Assets”, Working Paper, 30. Work Package 305, MS61 
Research paper on the determinants of intangible investment and 
different types of innovation. Welfare, Wealth, Work for Europe. 
Available at www.foreurope.eu. 
References 
 109 
 
Fernández Casillas, E. and Mate Rubio, J.M. (1994). “Análisis comparado 
entre España y la UE de la productividad del trabajo en la industria 
manufacturera”, Documentos de trabajo,106, Fundación Fondo para la 
Investigación Económica y Social, Obra Social de la Confederación Española 
de Cajas de Ahorro. 
Fukao, K., Miyagawa, T., Mukai, K., Shinoda, Y. and Tonogi, K. (2009). 
“Intangible Investment in Japan: Measurement and Contribution to 
Economic Growth”, Review of Income and Wealth, 55 (3), 717-736. 
García-Quevedo, J. and Afcha, S. (2009). “El impacto del apoyo público a la 
I+D empresarial: Un análisis comparativo entre las subvenciones 
estatales y regionales”, Investigaciones Regionales, 15, 277-294.  
Goodridge, P., Haskel, J. and Wallis, G. (2013). “Can Intangible Investment 
Explain the UK Productivity Puzzle?”, National Institute Economic Review, 
224, 48–58.  
Griliches, Z. (1992). “Output Measurement in the Service Sectors”, NBER 
Studies in Income and Wealth, 56, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. (2001). “R&D and 
Productivity Growth: Panel Data Analysis of 16 OECD Countries”, 
OECD Economic Studies, 33, 103–26. 
Hao, J. X., Manole, V. and Van Ark, B. (2009.). “Intangible Capital and 
Growth – an International Comparison”, Commission, European 
Programme, Seventh Framework, 1–63. 
Herzog, H. W. Jr. and Olsen, R. J. (1977). “Shift-Share Analysis Revisited: The 
Allocation Effect and the Stability of Regional Structure”, Journal of 
Regional Science, 17 (3), 441-454.  
Heymann, E. and Vetter, S. (2013), “Europe’s re-industrialisation: the gulf 
between aspiration and reality”, EU Monitor, Deutsche Bank. Available at 
http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3814/Resurrecting_in
dustrial_policy.html  
Ilmakunnas, P. and Piekkola, H. (2014). “Intangible investment in people and 
productivity”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 41, 443-456.  
Inklaar, R., O’Mahony, M., and Timmer, M. (2005). “ICT and Europe’s 
productivity performance: Industry-level growth account comparisons 
with the United States”, Review of Income and Wealth, 51 (4), 505–536. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-4991.2005.00166.x 
Jalava, J., Aulin-Ahmavaara, P. and Alanen, A. (2007). “Intangible capital in 
the Finnish business sector, 1975-2005”, ETLA Discussion Papers, 1103, 
References 
 110 
 
1–25. The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA). 
Available at http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/63632 
Jona-Lasinio, C., Iommi, M, and Manzocchi, S. (2011). “Intangible Capital and 
Productivity Growth in European Countries”, INNODRIVE Working 
Paper, 10, 26. 
Jorgenson, D. W. (Dir) (1995). Productivity Volume I: Postwar U.S. 
Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-10049-5 
(Vol.1). 
Jorgenson, D. W. (Dir) (1996). Productivity Volume 2: International 
Comparisons of Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 
0-262-10050-9 (Vol.2). 
Jorgenson, D. W. and Vu, K. (2005). “Information Technology and the World 
Economy”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107 (4), 631–650. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00430.x. 
Jorgenson, D. W., Ho, M. S. and Stiroh, K. J. (Dirs) (2005). Productivity 
Volume 3: International Comparisons of Economic Growth, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-10111-4 (Vol.3). 
Ledebur, L. C. and Moomaw, R. L. (1983). “A Shift-Share Analysis of 
Regional Labor Productivity in Manufacturing”, Growth and Change, 14 
(1), 2-9. 
Legarda, A. and Hidalgo, A. (2011). “Razones para desarrollar una política 
industrial activa en España”, Revista de Economía Industrial, 381, 113-125. 
Lev, B. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2003). “The Measurement of Firm-Specific 
Organization Capital”, NBER Working Paper, 9581, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Lev, B. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2005). “The Valuation of Organizational 
Capital,” in C. Corrado, J. Haltiwanger, and D. Sichel (eds), Measuring 
Capital in the New Economy, University Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 
73–110. 
Lichtenberg, F. (1993). “R&D Investment and International Productivity 
Differences,” in H. Siebert (ed.), Economic Growth in the World 
Economy, J. C. B. Mohr, Tubingen, 89–110. 
Lladós-Masllorens, J. (2002). “Estructura productiva y desigualdad regional: la 
transición hacia el euro y la economía del conocimiento”, Papeles de 
Economía Española, 93, 79-97. 
Lladós-Masllorens, J. and Fernández-Sirera, T. (2004) “La indústria catalana a 
Europea en el context de l’ampliació”, Nota d’Economia, 78, 9-26, 
Generalitat de Catalunya. Available at 
References 
 111 
 
http://economia.gencat.cat/web/.content/documents/articles/arxius/
laindustriacatalanaaeuropaenelcontextdel_ampliacio.pdf 
Marrano, M. G., and Haskel, J. (2006). “How much does the UK invest in 
intangible assets?”, Working Paper, 578, 28. Department of Economics 
Queen Mary, London. Available at 
http://www.economics.qmul.ac.uk/papers/doc/wp578.pdf 
Marrano, M. G., Haskel, J. and Wallis, G. (2009). “What happened to the 
Knowledge Economy? ICT , Intangible Investment, and Britain’s 
Productivity Record revisited”, Review of Income and Wealth, 55 (3), 686-
716. 
Martínez Álvarez, J.A., García Martos, D. and Manjón Vilela, S. (2014). “La 
política industrial encaminada hacia un mercado más moderno y 
competitivo”, Papeles de Trabajo, 6/2014, 1-36. Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales. 
Martínez Álvarez, J.A., Sánchez Figueroa, C. and Cortiñas Vázquez, P. (2013). 
“La economía española, su evolución y escenarios para la 
recuperación", CIRIEC, 78, 1-35. Valencia. 
Martínez, M. E. and Vega, J. (2012). “La industria española: situación actual y 
perspectivas de recuperación”, Revista de Estudios Empresariales (Segunda 
época), 2, 58-72. 
Martino, R. (2014). “Convergence and growth. Labour productivity dynamics 
in the European Union”, Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), 
1–27, Université de Strasbourg. 
Mas, M. et al. (2012). Industrial Productivity in Europe: Growth and Crisis. 
Editors: Matilde Mas & Robert Stehrer. Edward Elgar Editors. 
Mc Morrow, K., Röger, W. and Turrini, A. (2010). “Determinants of TFP 
growth: A close look at industries driving the EU–US TFP gap”, 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 21 (3), 165–180. 
doi:10.1016/j.strueco.2010.03.001 
Miyagawa, T. and Hisa, S. (2013). “Estimates of Intangible Investment by 
Industry and Productivity Growth in Japan”, Japanese Economic Review, 
64 (1), 42–72.  
Molero, J. (2011). “Innovación y cambio tecnológico”, in García Delgado, J. L. 
and Myro, R., Lecciones de Economía Española, X(5), 95-106. 
Muntean, T. (2014). “Intangible Assets and Their Contribution to Labour 
Productivity Growth in Ontario”, International Productivity Monitor, 27, 22–
40. 
References 
112 
 
Myro, R. (2012). “La competitividad exterior de la economía española y sus 
determinantes”, Economistas, 130, 39-47. Colegio de Economistas de 
Madrid. 
Myro, R. (2014). “Una nueva política para la industria”, Mediterráneo Económico, 
25, 297-313. Caja Mar. 
Nakamura, L. (1999). “Intangibles: what put the new in the new economy?”, 
Business Review, (Jul), 3–16. Available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedpbr/y1999ijulp3-16.html 
Nakamura, L. (2001). “What is the US Gross Investment in Intangibles? (At 
Least) One Trillion Dollars a Year!”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Working paper, 01-15, Philadelphia. 
OECD (2010). “New Sources of Growth: Intangible Assets”, OECD Project, 
December. 
OECD (2013a). “Growth, Innovation and Competitiveness Maximizing the 
Benefits of Knowledge- Based Capital”, OECD, February. 
OECD (2013b). “Interconnected Economies Benefiting From Global Value 
Chains”, OECD. 
OECD (2013c). “New Sources of Growth: Knowledge- Based Capital. Key 
Analyses and Policy Conclusions”, OECD Synthesis Report. 
OECD (2013d). “Raising the Returns to Innovation: Structural Policies for a 
Knowledge- Based Economy”, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, 
17, May. 
O'Mahony, M., and Vecchi, M., (2009) “R&D, knowledge spillovers and 
company productivity performance”, Research Policy, 38 (1), 35-44. 
O’Sullivan, E., Andreoni, A., López-Gómez, C. and Gregory, M. (2013). 
“What is new in the new industrial policy? A manufacturing systems 
perspective”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29 (2), 432-462. 
Owen, G. (2012). “Industrial policy in Europe since the Second World War: 
what has been learnt?”, ECIPE Occasional paper, 1. The European Centre 
for International Political Economy, Brussels, Belgium. Available at: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41902/. 
Park, W. G. (1995). “International R&D Spillovers and OECD Economic 
Growth”, Economic Inquiry, 33, 571–591. 
Pérez García et al. (2006). Productividad e internacionalización: el crecimiento 
español ante los nuevos cambios estructurales, Fundación BBVA, 
Bilbao. 
References 
113 
 
Petrakos, G., Kallioras, D. and Anagnostou, A. (2011). “Regional Convergence 
and Growth in Europe: understanding patterns and determinants”, 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 18 (4) 375–391 
Petrakos, G., Kallioras, D. and Anagnostou, A. (2011). “Regional Convergence 
and Growth in Europe: understanding patterns and determinants”, 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 18 (4) 375–391 
Petrakos, G., Kallioras, D. and Anagnostou, A. (2011). “Regional Convergence 
and Growth in Europe: understanding patterns and determinants”, 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 18 (4) 375–391. 
Pianta, M. (2013). “An Industrial Policy for Europe”, Socialist Project, Global 
Research and also as paper for the 19th Conference on Alternative Economic 
Policy in Europe, London 20-22 Sept 2013. 
Piekkola, H. (2011). “Intangible capital: The key to growth in Europe”, 
Intereconomics, 46 (2), 222–228. doi:10.1007/s10272-011-0387-2 
Raymond, J.L. and García-Greciano, B. (1994). “Las disparidades en el PIBpc 
entre las CC.AA. y la hipótesis de convergencia”, Papeles de Economía 
Española, 59, 38-58. 
Reiner, C., (2012). “Play it again, Sam: die Renaissance der Industriepolitik in 
der Großen Rezession”, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 38 (1), 15-56. 
Rincon, A. Vecchi, M., and Venturini, F., (2012). “ICT spillovers, absorptive 
capacity and productivity performance”, Quaderni del Dipartimento di 
Economia, Finanza e Statistica, 103/2012, Università di Perugia, 
Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica. 
Rodríguez, D. (2012). “La evolución reciente de la industria en España”, 
Economistas., 30 (131), 112–119. Colegio de Economistas de Madrid. 
Roth, F. and Thum, A. E. (2011). “Does Intangible Capital affect Economic 
Growth?”, Innodrive Working Paper, 3, 1-47, Innodrive Working Paper 
Series. 
Roth, F. and Thum, A. E. (2013). “Intangible capital and labor productivity 
growth: Panel evidence for the EU from 1998-2005”, Review of Income 
and Wealth, 59 (3), 486–508.  
Schreyer, P. (2008). “International Comparisons of Levels of Capital Input and 
Multifactor Productivity”, German Economic Review, 8 (2), 237-254. 
Sichel, D. (1997). “The Productivity Slowdown: Is a Growing Unmeasurable 
Sector the Culprit?”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79 (3), 367-370. 
Sichel, D. (2008). “Intangible capital”, in Durlauf, S.N. and Blume, L.E. (eds), 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
References 
 114 
 
Macmillan, 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_I000299  
Solow, Robert M. (1956). “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic 
Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70 (1), 65-94. 
Solow, Robert M. (1957). “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 39 (3), 312-320. 
Stiroh, K. J., (2002). “Are ICT spillovers driving the New Economy?”, Review 
of Income and Wealth, 48 (1), 33-57. 
Strobel, T. (2012). “New evidence on the sources of EU countries’ 
productivity growth-industry growth differences from R&D and 
competition”, Empirica, 39 (3), 293–325.  
Tervo, H. and Okko, P. (1983). “A Note on Shift-Share Analysis as a Method 
of Estimating the Employment Effects of Regional Economic Policy”, 
Journal of Regional Science, 23 (1), 115-121. 
Timmer, M. P. and Van Ark, B. (2005). “Does Information and 
communication Technology drive EU-US Productivity Growth 
Differentials?”, Oxford Economic Papers, 57, 693-716. 
Timmer, M. P., Inklaar, R., O’Mahony, M. and van Ark, B (2010). Economic 
growth in Europe. A comparative industry perspective. Cambridge University 
Press, ISBN 978-0-521-19887-5 Hardback. 
Timmer, M. P., Inklaar, R., O’Mahony, M. and van Ark, B. (2011). 
“Productivity and economic growth in Europe: A comparative industry 
perspective”. International Productivity Monitor, 21, 3–23. 
Timmer, M., van Moergastel,T., Stuivenwold, E., Ypma, G., O’Mahony, M. 
and Kangasniemi, M. (2007a). “EUKLEMS growth and productivity 
accounts, version 1.0, part I methodology” March, 2007. Available at 
http://www.euklems.net/data/EUKLEMS_Growth_and_Productivity
_Accounts_Part_I_. 
Timmer, M., van Moergastel,T., Stuivenwold, E., Ypma, G., O’Mahony, M. 
and Kangasniemi, M. (2007b). “EU KLEMS growth and productivity 
accounts, version 1.0”, part II sources by country, March, 2007. 
Available at 
http://www.euklems.net/data/EUKLEMS_Growth_and_Productivity 
Triplett, J. E. and Bosworth, B. P. (2008). “The State of Data for Services 
Productivity Measurement in the United States”, International Productivity 
Monitor, 16, 53-70. 
References 
 115 
 
Trullén, J. (2007). “La nueva política industrial española: innovación, 
economías externas y productividad”, Economía Industrial. Available at 
http://urban.uab.es/references/2006/06015.pdf . 
Valero, L. (2013). “La política industrial del Ministerio de Industria, Energía y 
Turismo: reindustrialización, competitividad y creación de empleo”, 
Revista de Economía Industrial, 387, 49-53. 
Van Ark, B., Hao, J. X., Corrado, C., and Hulten, C. (2009). “Measuring 
intangible capital and its contribution to economic growth in Europe”, 
European Investment Bank EIB Papers, 14 (1), 62–93. 
Van Ark, B., Levanon, G, Chen, V. and Cheng, B., (2012). “Performance 
2011: Productivity, employment and growth in the world’s economies”, 
Research Report R_-1475-11-RR, The Conference Board. 
Van Ark, B., O'Mahony, M., and Timmer, M. P. (2008). “The Productivity gap 
between Europe and the US: Trends and causes”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 22 (1), 25-44. 
Van Rooijen-Horsten, M., van den Bergen, D. and Tanriseven, M. (2008). 
“Intangible Capital in the Netherlands: A Benchmark”, Discussion Paper 
(08001), 22. Statistics Netherlands. Vorburg/Heerlen. Available at 
http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/DE0167DE-BFB8-4EA1-A55C-
FF0A5AFCBA32/0/200801x10pub.pdf 
Veugelers, R. (2013). “Manufacturing Europe’s future growth”, in 
Manufacturing Europe’s Future, 1-6. Reinhilde Veugelers Ed. Brueguel 
Blueprint Series Vol XXI. Belgium. Available at www.bruegel.org 
Veugelers, R. and Cincera, M. (2015). “How to Turn on the Innovation 
Growth Machine in Europe. The Impact of Horizon 2020 on 
Innovation in Europe”, Intereconomics 2015. Review of European Economic 
Policy, 50 (1). 
Veugelers, R. and Sapir, A. (2013). “Policies for manufacturing EU growth”, in 
Manufacturing Europe’s Future, 161-174. Reinhilde Veugelers Ed. 
Brueguel Blueprint Series Vol XXI. Belgium. Available at 
www.bruegel.org 
Vihriäla, Erkki and Wolff Guntram B. (2013). “Manufacturing as a source of 
growth for southern Europe: opportunities and obstacles”, in 
Manufacturing Europe’s Future. 48-72. Reinhilde Veugelers Ed. 
Brueguel Blueprint Series, Vol XXI. Belgium. Available at 
www.bruegel.org. 
Yallwe, A. H. and Buscemi, A. (2014). “An Era of Intangible Assets”, Journal of 
Applied Finance & Banking, 4 (5), 17–26. 
References 
